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Abstract 
THE EFFECTS OF RECIPROCITY AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ON BOARD 
MEMBERS’ CLAWBACK DECISIONS 
 
Melinda Armstrong Ford, Ph.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
My dissertation is composed of two studies, an experiment and a survey. The experiment 
examines whether the norm of reciprocity causes board members to make decisions that favor those 
who nominated them to the board. I hypothesize that board members are more likely to bias decisions 
in favor of the CEO at the expense of shareholders when the CEO nominated them for the board than 
when they were nominated by shareholders. I also examine whether this reciprocal behavior is greater 
when it is easier for the board member to rationalize helping the CEO. I test these predictions using an 
experiment in which the board member recommends the amount of incentive compensation to claw 
back from the CEO after an earnings restatement. I do not find my hypothesized results using board 
members’ own decisions because most board members report they would claw back the full amount 
regardless of who nominated them. I also use an approach common in psychology literature and 
examine board members’ beliefs about other board members’ clawback decisions, and find results 
consistent with my reciprocity hypothesis. Specifically, board members believe other board members 
will claw back less compensation from the CEO when they were nominated by the CEO than they do 
when nominated by shareholders. I find mixed evidence regarding whether board members claw back 
less when it is easier to rationalize helping the CEO. My survey investigates board members’ clawback 
decision further by examining board members’ perceptions regarding the decision to claw back 
compensation from a CEO. The findings of these studies inform the SEC’s current debates regarding 
whether to allow shareholders to nominate board members and how much discretion board members 
should have over clawback decisions. 
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1.0 Introduction 
After numerous corporate scandals in the early 2000’s, regulators (Sarbanes-Oxley, 
Section 301) and exchanges (NYSE, Section 303A) changed corporate governance requirements 
in an effort to improve oversight of top management. These rules and regulations address a long-
debated component of board composition, i.e. independence from management. Recent research 
investigates the concern that board members who are considered independent by the new standards 
are not necessarily independent in fact because of personal and professional relationships that are 
not, and possibly cannot be, addressed by the new requirements. But these relationships between 
board members and management may not be the only mechanism through which management can 
exert influence over directors. Current board practices may also lead board members to make 
decisions that are not independent and objective. One such practice is CEO influence over board 
nominations. The literature on reciprocity shows that individuals become obliged to each other on 
the basis of prior behavior (Gouldner, 1960). Thus, if the CEO nominates a director for the board, 
and the board member benefits from compensation or reputation effects, the new director may feel 
an obligation or a duty to return a favor to the CEO.  The goal of this study is to test whether, 
consistent with the social norm of reciprocity, directors’ decisions become aligned with the 
interests of the individual who appointed them to the directorship. 
 Apart from the CEO, another source of appointments for directors is a nominating 
committee. Over the last few decades, the percentage of boards that have a nominating committee 
has significantly increased, such that “virtually all boards (of S&P 500 companies) have a 
nominating/governance committee” (Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2006). Though the specific 
duties of nominating committees can vary by company, in general, the nominating committee is a 
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group of directors responsible for overseeing the selection and approval of nominations for 
directors to the board. One purpose of the nominating committee is to create an independent review 
process for nominating directors. However, recent research shows that even with nominating 
committees, CEO power over the nominating process varies greatly, with some CEOs having 
absolute control over the selection process (Clune et al., 2014). Thus, the presence of a nominating 
committee does not preclude CEO appointment of directors.  
Companies’ use of a nominating committee was intended to improve shareholder access to 
director nominations. A report by the Division of Corporation Finance (2003) indicates that, 
although nominating committees generally accepted shareholder recommendations for 
consideration, it was rare for the nominating committees to actually nominate the shareholder-
recommended candidates for the board on the proxy statement for shareholder vote.  
One recurring proposal to increase independence and oversight is to allow shareholders to 
directly nominate their own candidates for the board of directors. Before 2010, each time this 
proposal was put forward, the SEC decided not to act on it. The most recent attempt by the SEC 
in 2010 gave shareholders access to proxy materials, allowing certain shareholders the right to 
place their own nominations on the proxy statement, along with the board’s nominations, for the 
shareholder vote.1 However, this new regulation was overturned by the US Circuit Court of 
Appeals, who believed the SEC did not validate its claims that proxy access for shareholders would 
improve shareholder value and board performance (Holzer, 2011). In response to the call from the 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to analyze the potential benefits of shareholder nominations of 
directors, one purpose of my study is to examine whether having shareholders nominate board 
                                                 
1 The SEC requires shareholders to hold a minimum of 5% of the shares of the company, held for at least 3 
years, to be allowed access to the proxy statement with their director nomination. 
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members increases board independence from management via reciprocal behavior toward 
shareholders.  
More generally, my study examines the scenarios under which reciprocal behavior toward 
the person or group who nominated them affects board members’ decisions. If board members 
understand that their main duty is to represent shareholders, then reciprocal behavior by board 
members toward the CEO at the expense of the shareholders would be inconsistent with board 
members’ responsibilities to shareholders. As such, board members may experience two 
conflicting cognitions: the desire to reciprocate to the CEO and the desire to fulfill their duty as 
shareholder representatives. Thus, when it is salient that reciprocal actions depart from board 
member responsibilities, board members would experience cognitive dissonance, which is defined 
as the psychological discomfort that comes from wanting to act in a manner that is inconsistent 
with what they believe they should do (Festinger, 1957). To reduce this dissonance, board 
members must either change their beliefs or choose an action that will conform to their beliefs. 
Thus, in instances where it is salient how they should behave to fulfill their obligation to 
shareholders, board members may find it more difficult to change their beliefs. To avoid disutility 
from behaving in a manner inconsistent with their belief regarding their responsibility to 
shareholders, I expect them to choose the action that is consistent with shareholder preferences. In 
contrast, when shareholders’ desires are not clearly known, I expect board members to be more 
likely to change their beliefs to suit their desired action, i.e. reciprocating toward the nominating 
party. 
 
I conduct two studies, an experiment and a survey, to investigate board members’ clawback 
decisions. The experiment examines reciprocity in a clawback setting in which a CEO received 
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incentive compensation for achieving a target level of earnings. Subsequently, earnings were 
restated such that the CEO would not have achieved the target earnings if earnings had not been 
misstated.  The board members’ decision is whether and how much compensation to claw back 
from the CEO. I make the following three predictions regarding how reciprocity and cognitive 
dissonance will influence board members’ clawback responses. First, I hypothesize that board 
members who are nominated to the board by the CEO will claw back less of the CEOs’ 
compensation than participants who are nominated to the board by shareholders. Second, I 
hypothesize that board members will claw back less from the CEO when earnings miss the target 
by a small amount than when earnings miss the target by a large amount. Finally, I hypothesize an 
interaction between the nomination source and the restatement size – specifically, I predict that the 
difference in board members’ clawback decisions when shareholders nominate them versus when 
the CEO nominates them will be larger when earnings miss the target by a small amount than when 
earnings miss the target by a large amount.  
The experiment tests the effect of reciprocity and cognitive dissonance on the nomination 
process by using a 2 (large or small restatement size) x 3 (nominations by the CEO, a head-hunting 
firm, or shareholders) experimental design in which board member participants consider a 
hypothetical scenario. Participants are told that they have been elected to serve as new board 
members in the capacity of a compensation committee member and were nominated by the CEO, 
a head-hunting firm (baseline), or shareholders. The CEO is subject to a clawback provision that 
allows the board to recoup incentive compensation when a restatement of prior period earnings 
occurs that would have decreased the CEO’s compensation if the restated financial results had 
been known at the time. Participants are then told that the prior period’s income has been restated, 
which decreases net income below the performance target required for incentive compensation. I 
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vary the size of the restatement to vary the degree to which board members are likely to feel 
cognitive dissonance, either telling board members that income missed the target by a large amount 
or a small amount. The expectation is that the larger the restatement, the more difficult it would be 
to treat the CEO favorably at the expense of the shareholders. The new board members then decide 
how much of the CEO’s compensation to claw back and report the amount they believe other board 
members will claw back, on average.  
I test my hypotheses using board members’ own clawback responses and their beliefs about 
other board members’ clawback responses. I first use participants’ own clawback responses and 
find that the majority of board members report they would claw back the full amount of CEO 
compensation subject to the clawback policy, regardless of who nominated them to the board or 
the size of the restatement. Although this result is not consistent with my hypotheses, it is 
consistent with prior research on social desirability bias, which is the tendency of individuals to 
under-report socially undesirable behavior and to over-report socially desirable behavior (Paulhus, 
1984; Randall and Fernandes, 1991; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). In this literature, researchers 
overcome participants’ propensity to engage in social desirability bias by asking participants what 
they believe others would do. Anticipating that board members’ responses about their own 
behavior could differ from their expectations about other board members’ responses, I incentivized 
board members to estimate the average of other board members’ clawback decisions. I find that 
board members estimate that other board members will claw back significantly less than the board 
member would (i.e., their own clawback amount is greater than their beliefs about others’ clawback 
amount).  
Consequently, I next test my hypotheses again using board members’ estimate of other 
board members’ clawback decisions as the dependent variable in two different ways: 1) the 
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estimate of others’ clawback amounts, and 2) a dichotomous variable measuring whether 
participants estimated other board members would choose to claw back the full amount of CEO 
compensation. I find that board members believe other participants would claw back significantly 
less when board members were nominated by the CEO than when shareholders nominated them 
to the board, indicating that participants believe other board members will reciprocate toward the 
nominating party. This result also held when I used the dichotomous variable as the dependent 
measure. However, my predicted interaction of restatement size and nomination source is 
significant for the dichotomous variable only. I find mixed evidence regarding cognitive 
dissonance because the smaller restatement size did not consistently (i.e., across both dependent 
measures) make it more likely that board members would reciprocate to the CEO when nominated 
by the CEO. 
I also conducted a survey in which participants responded to questions about clawbacks in 
general after completing the experimental part of the study. The main findings of the survey are 
that board members believe clawbacks serve to instill shareholder confidence in the corporate 
governance of the firm, have a positive financial impact on shareholders, help to prevent future 
restatements, but can harm their relationship with the CEO. 
My experimental results extend prior clawback literature by examining how board member 
discretion influences clawback decisions. These results also have implications for regulators 
involved in new legislation regarding both shareholder nomination and clawback policies by 
providing evidence of the type requested by the US Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the 
consequences of CEO involvement in the nominating process and the effects of allowing 
shareholder access to the proxy statement for director nominations. My experiment provides 
evidence that board members believe other board members will use their discretion to reciprocate 
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toward the nominating party. By allowing shareholders to include their nominees in the proxy 
statement, the feelings of obligation created by the nominating process can be directed toward 
shareholders, thus increasing board members’ independence from management.  
My survey extends prior literature on clawbacks by providing information about board 
members’ beliefs regarding clawbacks in practice. The survey finds that board members believe 
no-fault clawback policies are fair to both the CEO and to shareholders and view clawbacks of 
compensation as a benefit to the company and to shareholders. The SEC is currently debating 
whether board members should have discretion over clawback decisions. Given the survey result 
mentioned earlier, that board members believe clawing back compensation from the CEO will 
harm their relationship, one benefit of eliminating board members’ discretion could be an 
improvement in the CEO and board members’ relationship.  
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2.0 Background and Motivation 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews the regulations and history related to board member nominations and 
clawbacks of CEO or other top managers’ compensation. Section 2.2 reviews the early proposals 
for shareholder nominations and the SEC responses to those proposals, the rise of nominating 
committees, and the more recent push for changing how shareholders submit names for 
nomination. Section 2.3 describes the clawback process and current related research and 
regulations. Section 2.4 elaborates on the motivation for my study. 
2.2 Shareholder Nominations 
2.2.1  History of Shareholder Access to the Proxy Statement 
The idea of shareholder nominations and access to the proxy statement has been debated 
for over 70 years. The first legislation to address this aspect of fair corporate suffrage was the 1942 
SEC adoption of rule 14. This legislation established the rules regarding shareholder access to 
proxy materials and set procedures for the way shareholders could present material for a 
shareholder vote. Though the SEC initially considered allowing shareholder nominations for the 
board in the proxy statements, five years later the Commission adopted rules allowing companies 
to exclude shareholder proposals relating to director elections (Exchange Act Section 14(a)-8).  
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In 1977, the SEC again addressed the topic of shareholder nominations for director 
elections to the board but decided against changing the proxy rules in Section 14. Instead, the SEC 
established disclosure requirements obliging companies to disclose whether the board has 
instituted a nominating committee, if the board will consider and evaluate shareholder proposals 
for nominations to the board, a copy of the charter for the nominating committee, and several other 
requirements the SEC believed were important to shareholders (Release No. 34-15384, Dec 1978). 
The nominating committee was meant to be an alternative to direct shareholder access to proxy 
materials in the nomination process. The SEC stated that it would monitor board progress in 
adopting nominating committees and the extent to which they considered shareholder proposals 
(Division of Corporation Finance Staff Report, July 15, 2003). Because of the rapid rate at which 
companies instituted nominating committees, the SEC concluded that revisiting shareholder access 
was not appropriate at that time. 
2.2.2  Nominating Committees 
Nominating committees consist of a group of directors whose responsibility, at least in 
part, is to find and approve directors for the board, establish processes for board nomination, and 
identify and communicate the necessary characteristics for potential board member candidates. Up 
until the late 1970’s, nominating committees and formal nomination processes were rare. It wasn’t 
until the SEC established requirements in 1978 regarding disclosure of the adoption of nominating 
committees and their processes that widespread adoption of nominating committees took place 
(Murphy, 2008). Bacon (1981) found that while only 8% of companies had a nominating 
committee in 1971, in 1980, approximately 30% of companies had adopted a nominating 
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committee. By 2006, “virtually all boards (99% of S&P 500 companies) had a 
nominating/governance committee” (Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2006).  
The SEC 1978 disclosure requirements regarding nominating committee adoption and 
processes was originally intended to improve shareholder access to director nominations. A report 
by the Division of Corporation Finance (2003) indicated that, although nominating committees 
generally accepted shareholder recommendations for consideration, the shareholders’ 
recommendations for board members were rarely included in the proxy statement. 
2.2.3  Current Legislation 
Another round of discussion ensued as a result of the corporate scandals in the early 2000’s.  
In 2003, the SEC put forth Proposal 14(a)-11 which, if enacted, would establish rules to allow 
shareholders limited access to a firm’s proxy statements after at least one of two proposed 
triggering events occurs. The first proposed triggering event would happen when 35% or more 
shareholders “withheld” their votes from one of management’s nominees in the previous annual 
shareholder meeting. The second triggering event would occur when a shareholder or group of 
shareholders proposes that the company be subject to rule 14(a)-11 and the proposal receives 50% 
or more of shareholder votes at the annual shareholder meeting. If either of these two events occurs, 
shareholders would gain access to the proxy statements for two years subsequent to the triggering 
event. With this proposal came numerous comments from shareholders, companies, and the legal 
community. Corporate boards and top management argued that such a regulation would “disrupt 
board dynamics and balkanize boards” (Henry McKinnell, Chairman, The Business Roundtable, 
2003).  Consistent with this viewpoint, Clune et al. (2014) find that nominating committees place 
significant focus on whether a potential candidate will “fit” within the current culture and style of 
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the board. Shareholder appointments would preclude board control over personality and 
background characteristics of the nominees, which directors believe are essential to the proper 
functioning of the board as a whole (Clune et al, 2014), but which has also been thought to be an 
impediment to independence (Murphy, 2008). With so much opposition, the SEC did not pursue 
adopting regulation in conjunction with this proposal for shareholder access at that time. 
One change the SEC made in 2003 for enhanced nominating committee disclosure within 
the proxy statement was to “require companies to identify the category or categories of persons or 
entities that recommended each nominee… specifically…those instances where a nominee was 
recommended by the chief executive officer of the company.” (SEC Disclosure Regarding 
Nominating Committee Functions, 2003). Thus, even without private information, all nominees 
are given information relating to the source of their appointment. 
With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), the SEC was given the authority to revisit 
legislation regarding shareholder nominations. In 2010, a new rendition of proposal 14(a)-11 
passed, requiring boards of directors to include shareholder nominations in proxy statements if 
state law and corporate bylaws permit shareholders to nominate directors at shareholder meetings. 
This proposal was in direct contrast to Section 14(a)-8, which allowed boards to exclude from the 
proxy statement any shareholder proposal related to director nomination or election, including 
information regarding current or potential directors that might influence director election.  
In July of 2011, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the new SEC legislation, 
stating that the SEC did not adequately analyze the costs and benefits of the new law. The SEC 
was required by law to study the effects of its ruling on efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation. Of more relevance to this study was the censure that the SEC did not validate its claims 
that proxy access for shareholders would improve shareholder value and board performance 
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(Holzer, 2011). Until the SEC fulfills the mandate from the courts, shareholder access will continue 
to be subject to rule 14(a)-8, which allows boards to exclude shareholder nomination of directors 
in proxy materials. 
2.3 Clawbacks of Executive Compensation 
2.3.1  History of Clawback Policy Adoption 
Clawbacks are recoveries of performance-based compensation that was previously paid to 
an executive or other employee of the firm. Clawback policies, which are the firms’ specific rules 
that stipulate the triggers for and the types of compensation subject to a clawback, have become 
increasingly popular in public companies as a result of regulators’ interest in recouping 
erroneously-awarded executive compensation. Babenko et al. (2012) find that less than 1% of S&P 
1500 firms had adopted clawback policies in 2001. Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) introduced the first 
regulation related to clawbacks of executive compensation in Section 304, which gave the SEC 
the ability to recoup bonuses from executives when financial statements were restated as a result 
of material noncompliance with reporting guidelines and misconduct. Despite the new regulation, 
the SEC recovered compensation very rarely (Fried and Shilon 2011). Schwartz (2009) reported 
that in the first six years after adoption of SOX (2002), the SEC recovered compensation in 
response to Section 304 only twice. Khuzami, a SEC Director in the Division of Enforcement, said 
in a speech to the Society of American Business Editors (2010) that the SEC litigated clawbacks 
in only 11 cases in the two and a half years prior to his speech. 
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Babenko et al. (2012) report the number of firms who adopt clawback policies by year. 
Interestingly, the number of firms who adopted clawback policies increased at a very slow rate 
until 2007, likely due to the SEC’s inaction on the existing regulation. In 2006, the Council of 
Institutional Investors submitted a proposal to the SEC to require companies to either disclose their 
clawback policy or state their reasons for not having a clawback policy. The SEC adopted this 
proposal in Section 402(b)(2)(viii) of Regulation S-K. Beginning in 2007, the rate of clawback 
policy adoption increased rapidly.  In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act established new rules for 
clawbacks of executive compensation that removed the necessity of misconduct. Since 2010, 
clawback policy adoptions have continued to increase. The Equilar Executive Compensation & 
Governance Outlook (2017) reported that 92% of S&P 500 firms disclosed a clawback policy in 
2016.  
2.3.2  Clawback Literature Review 
Recent academic literature on clawbacks primarily focuses on the economic impacts and/or 
determinants of adoption of clawback policies. Firms that voluntarily adopt clawback policies are 
associated with ex post decreases in accounting restatements, current earnings response coefficient 
increases, audit fee decreases, lower likelihood of reported internal control weaknesses, reductions 
in discretionary accruals (but increases in real earnings management), lower subsequent likelihood 
of shareholder litigation, positive market reaction to adoption of the policy, and increases in total 
CEO compensation2 (Chan et al. 2012, Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013, Babenko et al. 2015, and 
                                                 
2 Dehaan et al. (2013) find an increase in total and base executive compensation. Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2013) find no evidence to suggest that CEO compensation increases after clawback policy adoption. 
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Dehaan et al. 2013, Chan et al. 2014).  However, Denis (2012) argues that some of these findings 
could have alternative explanations, such as clawback policy adoption giving the illusion of greater 
information quality to auditors and investors, or that adoption is merely one of several components 
of a firm’s new strategy to increase monitoring and improve company financials. Her perspective 
suggests that rather than causing all of these effects, it is possible that these factors are the 
determinants of adopting a clawback policy. 
Several archival studies examine the determinants of clawback adoption. Brown et al. 
(2011) show that lower CEO influence on the board, larger firms, and higher mergers and 
acquisitions bonuses are associated with adoption of clawback policies. Babenko et al. (2015) find 
a correlation between clawback policy adoption and firms that have greater external monitoring, 
firms with prior executive misconduct, greater board member independence, and a preference for 
low-risk executives. Addy et al. (2014) find an increased likelihood of adopting a clawback policy 
when firms have a monitoring governance structure versus management entrenchment and when 
firms’ compensation committee members have interlock relationships with board members from 
other organizations that have clawback policies.  
In addition to the literature on the determinants and impacts of clawback policy adoption, 
there are a few studies that examine the effects of clawbacks experimentally. Pyzoha (2015) 
conducts an experiment testing how management discretion over the restatement decision affects 
the frequency of financial restatements. He finds that when management has relatively more power 
than the audit firm, having a clawback policy leads to fewer restatements. Pyzoha’s (2015) results 
suggest an alternative explanation for the results found in Chan et al. (2012) and Dehaan et al. 
(2013), both of which suggested that adopting a clawback policy led to fewer restatements due to 
increased financial statement quality. Hodge and Winn (2012 working paper) conduct an 
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experiment examining the effect of clawbacks on management’s risk-taking behavior after 
enforcement of a clawback. They find that managers who took relatively less risk than other 
managers before the restatement took relatively more risk than other managers after the clawback 
was enforced. Both of these experiments examine changes in management behavior as a result of 
clawback policy adoption. 
In summary, the research on clawbacks provides some evidence about the determinants 
and impacts of voluntary adoption of clawback policies as well as some evidence regarding how 
managers respond to clawback adoption and enforcement. To my knowledge, no research has 
focused on how board members make decisions regarding actual clawbacks of compensation.  One 
reason for this may be the paucity of data. Babenko (2015) find no instances of clawbacks for 232 
firms who adopted a clawback policy and have subsequent restatements. My research extends the 
existing literature by examining how board members make decisions regarding clawbacks of 
compensation. Specifically, I focus on whether board member independence, which has an impact 
on clawback policy adoption, also affects board members’ clawback decisions. 
2.4 Motivation 
Shareholders have made numerous attempts to pass legislation that will allow them to 
include their own nominations for board members in proxy statements. Despite 70 years of 
intermittent consideration of shareholder access, the SEC only recently passed legislation requiring 
companies to include shareholder nominations in proxy statements. However, this legislation was 
then promptly overturned by the US Circuit Court of Appeals who required the SEC to perform 
more analyses regarding the costs and benefits of such legislation. Shareholder groups that 
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supported some level of proxy reform stated that, in addition to providing shareholders with access 
to the election process to nominate director candidates who would represent investors' best 
interests, such reform would also make corporate directors more responsive to shareholder 
concerns (SEC Staff Report, 2015). My research is designed to provide evidence on a potential 
benefit of requiring firms to include shareholders’ nominations of board members in the proxy 
statement for shareholder vote. The potential benefit could be to increase board members’ sense 
of obligation to shareholders through the board members’ desire to behave reciprocally toward the 
shareholders. In addition, my study adds to the literature on clawbacks of executive compensation 
by examining how board members perceive and make clawback decisions. 
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3.0 Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews psychology theory and other literature to develop the hypotheses 
tested in my experiment. Section 3.2 discusses regulator’s rationale for keeping board members 
independent from management and describes related research findings. Section 3.3 discusses how 
the social norm of reciprocity relates to board of director processes. Section 3.4 describes the 
history of clawback provisions and Section 3.5 reviews the literature on cognitive dissonance and 
discusses how it could affect board member decisions. 
3.2 Board Member Independence 
As evidenced by the increasing number of rules, regulations, and proposals in the Exchange 
Act, Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and exchange listing requirements, director independence from 
management is a widely recognized necessity for effective corporate governance and oversight of 
top management. Sarbanes-Oxley stipulates that the audit committee for public companies must 
be fully independent (SOX 2003) and both Nasdaq and the NYSE require that the majority of the 
directors on the board (NYSE 303A) and all members of the nominating committee be independent 
(NYSE 303A.04, 2009; Nasdaq 5601, 2009).3 In addition, an Institutional Shareholder Services 
                                                 
3 SEC requirements only mandate disclosure of nominating committee independence, or lack thereof; 
however, for any publicly listed company, independence is required by the exchange in which they are listed. 
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(ISS) policy survey (2010) asked investors to rank corporate governance topics and found that 
investors in all markets ranked board independence as the most important. According to Sarbanes-
Oxley (2002), a board member is considered independent if the director does not receive 
compensation from consulting, advisory, or other services apart from service on the board and is 
not considered an affiliate of the company or any of its subsidiaries.4 Exchanges have specified to 
great length the types of relationships that are prohibited for nominating committee members with 
the expressed hope that eliminating these types of relationships will help prevent impaired 
judgments by board members and make the nomination process more objective and independent 
from the CEO. 
Researchers have argued that these regulations overlook independence concerns stemming 
from social relationships between management and directors. Directors who meet the 
independence criteria of the regulations are said to be independent “on paper,” but because of other 
social relationships, these directors may not be independent in fact (Clune et al. 2014). Some of 
these relationships are connections through previous employment, education, or extracurricular 
organizations and are shown to be correlated with reductions in firm value (Fracassi and Tate 
2012), earnings management (Krishnan et al., 2011), and financial reporting quality (Dey and Liu 
2010).  Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) and exchange listing requirements (NYSE 303A, Nasdaq 5601) 
have helped change the composition of boards of directors over time through independence “on 
paper” improvements, but the concerns regarding independence from social and professional 
relationships remain.  
                                                 
4 An affiliate relationship is not specifically defined. The NYSE requires that each board broadly considers 
all relevant factors in determining independence from management and to consider all issues from both the standpoint 
of the director and the person or organization with whom there is a relationship to determine whether this relationship 
might impair the ability of the director to make independent judgments about management or the listed company. 
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The independence requirements do not preclude CEO involvement in the board nomination 
process. In 1989, while nominating committees were still on the rise, Lorsh and MacIver (1989) 
interviewed approximately 80 board members and found that, while 84% of board members had 
nominating committees on their board, shareholders “were obviously not involved until the 
election phase, and even at this point, their impact is negligible.” The interviews revealed that the 
CEOs still had more relative power in the boardroom over nominations than did nominating 
committees, with each having separate duties concerning nominations. The CEO was responsible 
for identifying candidates while the nominating committee performed the evaluations of the 
candidates and formally nominated them. This division of duties highlights some potential 
concerns with the new disclosure requirements for the source of board member nomination 
because disclosure may not accurately reflect whether the CEO or the nominating committee is in 
fact responsible for the initial nomination of board members. 
In a more recent study, Clune et al. (2014) interview 20 fully independent directors who sit 
on nominating committees and find that the CEO’s role in the nominating process is now highly 
variable. In some companies, the CEOs have absolute control over the nominating process, while 
in other companies, the CEO has as much input as any other director on the board, and in still other 
companies, the CEOs provide little to no input. Thus, the current independence requirements have 
not ensured more independent and objective nominations. 
Several archival research studies have examined independence concerns between 
management and directors resulting from relationships not addressed by legislation, but little has 
been done to investigate how board processes might impair independence. One concern relates to 
the processes used to nominate new directors to the board. With the wide variation in nominating 
committee processes, described earlier, it is difficult to use field data to isolate the effect of CEO 
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influence in the selection process (Callahan et al. 2003). Only a few studies have attempted to 
address the effects of CEO control over the appointment of new directors. Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) find that CEO involvement in the director selection process results in the nomination of 
directors that are less independent on paper. They use CEO presence on the nominating committee 
and lack of a nominating committee as evidence of CEO involvement. Carcello et al. (2011) find 
some evidence that CEO involvement in the nominating process leads to a reduction in audit 
committee effectiveness.  Westphal and Zajac (1995) examine how CEO versus board power 
affects new director selection. They find that when the CEO (board) has relatively more power 
than the board (CEO), new director nominees have characteristics similar to the party with more 
power. In contrast, Lisic et al. (2016) find no evidence that CEO involvement in the director 
selection process yields any changes in internal control weaknesses, a proxy for audit committee 
effectiveness, when CEO power is included in their model.5 
The focus of the archival research described above has been to determine whether CEO 
influence over the nomination process yields nominations of directors with other social ties to the 
CEO, even though they may appear to be independent “on paper.” To my knowledge, no research 
to date has focused on how the nominating process itself could decrease independence by creating 
an environment in which the CEO’s act of nominating causes the new director to feel obligated to 
reciprocate the CEO’s support in the nomination process. 
                                                 
5 The variable for CEO power is based on a summary index including multiple measures of CEO influence 
and power within the company, including role as chairman of the board, higher relative compensation, tenure, 
expertise, number of years within the company, etc. The reason audit committee effectiveness is used as the dependent 
variable by Lisic et al. (2016) and Carcello et al. (2011) is that previous research finds a positive relationship between 
independent audit committees and audit committee effectiveness. 
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3.3 The Social Norm of Reciprocity 
Jay Lorsch, a Harvard professor who interviewed over 80 board members, said of the 
relationship between the CEO and the board of directors, “It is no exaggeration to say that many 
directors are beholden to the CEO for their position, when they are in fact supposed to be 
monitoring the CEO's performance/position (Lorsch and Young, 1990).” Research on the social 
norm of reciprocity shows that when one party behaves in a way that directly benefits a second 
party, the second party feels a moral obligation to reciprocate in a manner that will benefit the first 
party (Gouldner, 1960; Fehr et al, 1998, Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 1996). Research on this 
psychological phenomenon shows it to be prevalent across generations, social groups, and cultures 
(Sutter and Kocher, 2006; Kugler et al., 2007; Gachter and Herrmann, 2009), which indicates that 
even experienced board members are likely to engage in reciprocal behavior.   
Appointment to a board of directors increases the new member’s income through a direct 
salary from the company and through reputation effects, which may result in additional 
directorship opportunities at other companies. These positive effects on the new directors’ income 
are likely to induce a sense of obligation to behave reciprocally toward the party who nominated 
them to their new position. Although nominations to a board of directors can come from various 
sources, two prominent nominating sources are the CEO and shareholders.6 For a board member 
to behave reciprocally toward the CEO or shareholders for nominating them, they must know who 
nominated them to the board. Discussions with compensation consultants at Pay Governance, 
                                                 
6 In addition to CEO and shareholder nominations, board members are also sometimes nominated by other 
sources such as current board members or search firms (PwC, 2016). 
 22 
LLC., who work closely with CEOs and board members, confirmed that board members typically 
know who nominated them to the board.   
3.4 Board Member Discretion Over Clawback Decisions 
There are numerous ways board members could reciprocate to the CEO or shareholders 
because board members have discretion over CEO compensation. One compensation issue that 
has received increasing attention in recent years is the clawback of executive compensation. A 
clawback is the recovery of compensation that was previously paid to an employee, usually as 
defined by the company’s clawback policy. Though clawback policies stipulate the conditions 
under which employees are subject to a potential clawback, board members have discretion over 
the actual decision to claw back. As of 2016, approximately 92% of S&P 500 firms disclose a 
clawback policy. Approximately 50% of these firms have company policies stipulating that 
financial restatements can trigger the company’s clawback process, which is then subject to board 
member discretion (Equilar Executive Compensation & Governance Outlook, 2017). Given board 
members’ discretion over the clawback decision, this is an ideal setting in which to study whether 
board members behave reciprocally toward those who nominate them to the board. 
The SEC recently addressed board member discretion over clawback decisions as part of 
the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010). In July 2015, the Commission proposed new 
requirements that, if approved, would require companies to claw back incentive-based executive 
compensation whenever a financial restatement of a prior year’s financial statements led to 
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erroneously awarded compensation. Enacting this proposal would largely eliminate board 
discretion over whether to claw back compensation and how much to recover.7 
The SEC’s five Commissioners voted 3-2 in favor of formally proposing the changes in 
clawback policies described above (Proposal Rule 10D-1) and opened discussion on the proposal 
for public commentary as of July 1, 2015. The SEC closed the window for public commentary on 
September 14, 2015, but has yet to either revise or vote on adoption of the proposal. Regardless of 
their position on the proposal, all Commissioners agreed that the primary concern and underlying 
motivation for any clawback policy should be to protect shareholder interests. In a statement about 
the new clawback proposal, SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White, who voted in favor of the proposal, 
stated that the new rules would “result in increased accountability and greater focus on the quality 
of financial reporting, which will benefit investors and the market (Eavis, 2015).” Luis A. Aguilar, 
another Commissioner who voted for the proposal, argued that the purpose of incentive 
compensation, which is to align management and shareholder interests, is not achieved when 
erroneously awarded incentive compensation is not clawed back. Finally, Kara Stein, the third 
SEC Commissioner in favor of the proposal, stated that, “investors should not be left holding the 
bag while executives reap benefits when reporting false financial results (Ackerman, 2015 The 
Wall Street Journal/Stein, 2015).” Her statement highlights how shareholders are hurt financially 
when boards decide not to claw back erroneously awarded compensation from management. 
                                                 
7 Proposal Rule 10D-1 (2015) would allow boards to continue applying discretion when the cost of 
implementing the clawback is greater than the amount of compensation being recovered or when the “award (subject 
to the clawback) is based on both the achievement of a financial reporting measure and the application of discretion 
by the compensation committee (Covington Report, 2015).” The SEC provides additional guidance for how to 
calculate the amount of the clawback in this instance: the amount of compensation based on the financial reporting 
method is recalculated with the restated financial results and then the discretion originally applied in the compensation 
decision is taken into account to determine the amount of the award the executive should have received. The difference 
between the amount the executive should have received is deducted from the amount actually received and is the 
amount the company is required to claw back. 
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Shareholders benefit from clawing back erroneously awarded compensation because the recouped 
amount lowers the firm’s compensation expense, which increases the firm’s and, therefore, the 
shareholders’ wealth. In contrast, not clawing back erroneously awarded compensation allows the 
CEO and/or other executive(s) to keep the compensation at the expense of the shareholders.  
The dissenting Commissioners, Daniel M. Gallagher and Michael S. Piwowar, also believe 
that clawback policies should protect shareholders, but are nevertheless reluctant to eliminate 
board discretion. They believe that eliminating board discretion is either: 1) unnecessary or 2) 
would hurt shareholders. Commissioner Gallagher argued that directors should keep broad 
discretion over the clawback decision process because “good corporate boards are tools for 
shareholder protection.”8 Gallagher believes it is unnecessary, arguing that removing board 
discretion “reflects a view that a corporate board is the enemy of the shareholder, not to be trusted 
to do the right thing (Gallagher, 2015).” He believes that the new policy’s requirement for 
disclosure of compensation committee decisions not to claw back allows shareholders to vote out 
directors who do not use their discretion in the best interest of the shareholders, thus suggesting it 
is unnecessary to remove board members’ discretion. However, some anecdotal evidence suggests 
that shareholders for many firms may not or cannot effectively use their vote in this manner.9 
                                                 
8 Commissioner Gallagher believes board members should be able to decide whether to implement a 
clawback, whether to recover compensation less than the full amount subject to the clawback policy, whether there 
should be a de minimus amount that is not worth pursuing, and whether to settle a clawback through alternative 
methods. Alternative methods are to be used for instances where the executive does not have the cash to return the 
unearned compensation immediately. For example, the board could withhold future pay. 
 
9 Contrary to this argument, both Mylan and Wells Fargo are recent examples of board members keeping 
their positions despite low shareholder approval. Thus, shareholders are not always able to protect themselves from 
board members who do not act in the shareholders’ best interest. In June 2017, more than half of Mylan’s shareholders 
voted against Wendy Cameron, a board member who chaired the compensation committee and oversaw the excessive 
compensation payout in 2016 to former Robert Coury, despite the effect the company’s epi-pen scandal had on stock 
price that year. Despite having the majority vote, shareholders who voted against Cameron’s re-election were 
unsuccessful in removing her because Mylan’s company policy requires two-thirds vote against re-election of board 
members. Wells Fargo board members Stephen W. Sanger and Enrique Hernandez Jr. received only 56% and 53% of 
shareholder votes, respectively – a very low tally. Chairman Sanger responded that the large number of shareholder 
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Commissioner Piwowar’s expressed concern is that the proposed policies would have 
unintended, negative consequences for shareholders (Piwowar 2015). Although he believes that 
“a properly designed clawback rule could yield real benefits to shareholders,” he indicated he could 
not support the current proposal because of the potential for substantial legal costs to reclaim CEO 
compensation and the potential increase in executive salaries that could result from imposing 
additional risk on executives.10 Thus, both Gallagher’s and Piwowar’s dissenting statements 
emphasize reasons why the proposed clawback regulation would not help investors, despite the 
Commission’s goal of protecting them.  
In summary, the subject of debate among the Commissioners is not about whether to 
establish requirements for clawback policies, but rather about the specifics of how, and whether, 
those policies protect investors. One purpose of my study is to help inform the continuing debate 
on Proposal Rule 10D-1 by providing insight into how board members use their discretion in a 
clawback setting. In addition, by testing the effects on clawback decisions of CEO versus 
shareholder involvement in the nominating process, I provide evidence on how the nominating 
source relates to the SEC’s concerns regarding board discretion on clawback policies. Specifically, 
if shareholder versus CEO nomination of board members results in different director clawback 
decisions, this could provide insight for regulators’ policy decisions. That is, if shareholder 
nominations result in higher clawbacks than when the CEO nominates, then a policy that allows 
                                                 
votes against them were meant as a rebuke for the whole board, rather than individual members and that no board 
members planned to resign as a result of the vote (Cowley, 2017). 
 
10 Commission Piwowar believes that managers, when confronted with higher risk of losing the incentive 
compensation component of their pay, will demand higher pay to make up for the increased risk. He refers to the 
substantial increase in executive pay after Section 162(m) in the Internal Revenue Code was enacted as an example 
of this unintended consequence. 
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shareholder nominations could mitigate concerns about board discretion in clawback decisions 
since it increases shareholder value.  
3.5 Cognitive Dissonance 
Not all situations that could potentially trigger a board member’s sense of obligation are 
likely to result in reciprocal behavior. Reciprocity is only one possible obligation of board 
members. In the context of a potential clawback, board members will also feel a strong sense of 
obligation to the shareholders because the board bears primary responsibility for protecting 
shareholder interests. When shareholders nominate the board member, these two obligations 
influence board member decisions in a consistent direction, i.e. to clawback erroneously awarded 
compensation. However, when the CEO nominates the board member, the obligations are 
competing and cannot both be fulfilled simultaneously. That is, board members cannot both behave 
reciprocally to the CEO by choosing not to claw back compensation, and simultaneously protect 
shareholders by clawing back compensation from the CEO.  
When board members face competing obligations, i.e. when the CEO nominates them, the 
board members will need to violate one of their perceived obligations. Prior research finds that 
awareness of such a violation results in feelings of psychological discomfort, known as cognitive 
dissonance (Sloane, 1944; Festinger, 1957, Aronson, 1969, Higgins, 1989). Cognitive dissonance 
occurs when individuals are aware of inconsistencies between their actions and beliefs. They seek 
to reduce or eliminate the discomfort they feel by changing either their beliefs or their actions, 
searching for and acquiring additional information that will support their desired decision, or 
reducing the importance of the inconsistent belief or action (Festinger, 1957).  
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Though individuals can change their opinions or beliefs to some extent, they are 
constrained by their ability to construct a reasonable and believable argument to convince 
themselves of the desired conclusion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Kunda, 1990; Brown, 2014). 
Because the view that a board member’s primary responsibility is to represent shareholders is 
widely held (Demb and Neubauer, 1992), board members will need to justify any action that is not 
consistent with shareholders’ interests.  When shareholders nominate a board member, the board 
member’s reciprocal obligation to the shareholders is consistent with their obligation to act in the 
best interest of shareholders. Thus, the board members will not experience cognitive dissonance. 
However, when the CEO nominates the board member, s/he will need to find a reasonable 
justification for not clawing back compensation in order to behave reciprocally toward the CEO. 
If the board member cannot come up with a reasonable justification for not clawing back, s/he will 
be more likely to claw back the CEO’s compensation.  
In the context of my study, when board members are more certain about their expected 
duty to shareholders (i.e. when the clawback decision is more clear-cut), they will find it difficult 
to justify acting reciprocally toward the CEO. Shareholder interests are more likely to be clear-cut 
when the company has a large restatement that misses the incentive compensation target by a large 
amount. For example, if the company restates earnings, and the restated amount then misses the 
target amount for incentive compensation by a large amount, board members would be more sure 
that shareholders would expect them to claw back the erroneously awarded compensation from the 
CEO.  
In contrast, when the restated earnings amount misses the incentive compensation target 
by a smaller amount, board members will be less sure about shareholder expectations over the 
decision to claw back. In such cases, because shareholders’ expectations regarding the clawback 
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are ambiguous, board members who wish to behave reciprocally toward the CEO or shareholders 
can more easily justify reciprocal behavior. Thus, when board members do not have a clear 
understanding of which decision is in the best interest of shareholders, I expect that the decision 
to claw back will vary depending on who nominated them to the board. Clawing back 
compensation from the CEO will result in the same financial benefit to shareholders, regardless of 
who nominates the board member. However, when the CEO is the nominating party, board 
members can rationalize that, for example, the CEO was close enough to getting the incentive 
compensation that it would be unfair to claw back or that the impact of this decision on 
shareholders is small enough that it will not matter to them. In contrast, when shareholders 
nominate, the board members might place more emphasis on the financial benefit to shareholders 
of clawing back compensation from the CEO. As a result, the effect of reciprocity on board 
member decisions to claw back will be greater when the decision to claw back is ambiguous than 
when the decision to claw back is clear-cut.  
Therefore, my hypotheses are: 
 
H1: Board members will claw back less when the CEO nominates the board member than 
when shareholders nominate the board member. 
H2: Board members will claw back less when the earnings miss the target by a small 
amount than by a large amount. 
H3: The difference in board members’ clawback decisions when shareholders nominate 
them versus when the CEO nominates them will be larger when earnings miss the target by a small 
amount than when earnings miss the target by a large amount.  
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4.0 Research Method 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 4 describes my research method. Section 4.2 describes the participants and 
explains how they were recruited. Section 4.3 describes the design of my experiment. The 
procedures I use to test my hypotheses are explained in Section 4.4. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 describe 
my dependent variables and the information collected in the post-experimental questionnaire, 
respectively.    
4.2 Participants 
Participants are 112 board members of public, private, and not-for-profit US companies. 
They average 54 years of age, have an average of 32 years of business experience, and 84% are 
male. Because there is a small population of board members and because many of them serve on 
several boards of different types of firms, no board members were excluded from participating in 
my study. Approximately 33% of participants have served on public boards and 21% of 
participants have served on only not-for-profit boards. Participants were recruited through 
networking. Emails were sent to individuals in this network, who then forwarded my email to 
potential participants (See Appendix B for the recruitment message). Board members who agreed 
to participate accessed the study through a link provided in the email, which took them to an online 
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platform in Qualtrics. As payment for their participation, participants chose either a $25 Amazon 
gift card or a $25 donation to a charity. 
4.3 Design 
I test my hypotheses by using a 3 (Nomination Source) x 2 (Restatement Size) full factorial 
design. I manipulated Nomination Source by telling participants that they have been nominated to 
a firm’s board of directors by either the CEO, a group of shareholders, or a head-hunting firm. In 
the CEO Nomination condition, participants are told that the CEO, who has no prior personal 
relationship with them, nominated them to fill a vacant position on the board. In the Shareholder 
Nomination condition, a group of large investors who jointly own a significant portion of the shares 
of the company nominated them for the vacant position. In the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination 
condition, a third-party head-hunting firm who submits names to the company for new board 
members nominates the participant. I vary the nominating source such that the obligation to 
reciprocate either competes with (i.e., CEO Nomination) or is consistent with (i.e., Shareholder 
Nomination) the obligation to protect shareholder interests. The Head-Hunting Firm Nomination 
condition serves as a baseline in which participants cannot act reciprocally toward the nominating 
source. This baseline condition is used to determine whether board members’ clawback decisions 
in the CEO Nomination and Shareholder Nomination conditions differ from those of board 
members who have no reason, apart from the universal obligation to shareholders, to act 
reciprocally toward either the CEO or the shareholders.  
The Restatement Size manipulation varies the degree to which board members can 
plausibly justify not clawing back, and has two levels, Large and Small. In the Large Restatement 
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condition, the restated earnings amount falls below the earnings target by a large amount. 
Specifically, in the Large Restatement condition, restated earnings drop more than 20% below the 
earnings target. I chose this amount based on interviews with compensation consultants of Fortune 
500 companies and board members who were not participants in the study.11  In the Small 
Restatement condition, the restated earnings amount is only about 5% below the earnings target. 
Based on interviews with the parties mentioned above, I chose the amount of the restatement in 
the Small Restatement condition such that board members would be less certain about whether, 
and how much, they should claw back from the CEO. (See Appendix C for the wording used in 
the manipulations in my experiment.) 
4.4 Procedures 
The flowchart in Figure 1 shows the steps in the experiment. Participants have access to all 
materials in all phases of the experiment except when responding to the manipulation check 
questions. Participants are prevented from revisiting previous pages or changing answers provided 
previously.  
  
                                                 
11 Compensation consultants and board members corroborated (independently of each other) that when CEOs 
achieve 80% or more of the incentive benchmark, they often receive at least some portion of contracted incentive 
compensation. Thus, if the CEO almost meets the earnings target, it is often the case that he/she receives almost the 
full amount of contracted incentive compensation for meeting the target. However, if earnings fall below the 
contracted range, the CEO does not earn any incentive compensation.   
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Figure 1 Flowchart of Experimental Design 
  
In step 1, participants read a hypothetical scenario describing their appointment to a board 
of directors. They assume the role of a newly-elected board member at a children’s clothing 
company named Molly Coddle, Inc. My main manipulations are operationalized in this step.  The 
first manipulation is Nomination Source. As explained above, participants are told that they were 
nominated by the CEO, a head-hunting firm, or a group of shareholders. In all cases, they are 
informed that they have no prior affiliation or relationship with the nominating party. Participants 
are then given information about the compensation paid to the CEO last year and the performance 
measures used for the incentive-based part of that compensation. Specifically, the CEO received 
$7 million in incentive compensation, of which $4.5 million was awarded based on exceeding a 
target net income of $945 million. 
Participants are also given the firm’s clawback policy for managers. The clawback policy 
used in the experiment is adapted from Johnson & Johnson’s (J&J’s) clawback policy (see 
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Appendix C for J&J’s full clawback policy). The policy used in the experiment states that 
clawbacks of managerial compensation will be made on a no-fault basis, meaning that no 
misconduct is required for recovery of compensation. It also states that board members have full 
discretion over whether, and to what extent, the clawback policy will be enforced. Additionally, 
to highlight to participants the impact that a clawback has on shareholders, the policy states that 
any amount clawed back will be distributed as a dividend to shareholders, including board 
members. However, any manager whose compensation is clawed back cannot benefit from any 
dividends to shareholders as a result of the clawback. Thus, clawbacks would directly benefit 
shareholders of the company and not clawing back would directly benefit the CEO at the expense 
of shareholders. 
Participants are told that this year’s audit uncovered an overstatement of the prior year’s 
inventory and that it is unclear whether the misstatement was intentional. As a result, the financial 
statements were restated, which decreased last year’s net income below the earnings target used to 
award the CEO’s incentive compensation for the previous year. My second manipulation, 
Restatement Size, varies whether restated earnings falls 20% or 5% below the earnings target. 
In step 2, participants’ task is to decide how much, if any, of last year’s incentive 
compensation to claw back from the CEO. They are asked to provide an amount, from none to the 
full amount of incentive compensation paid to the CEO for meeting the earnings target ($4.5 
million), that they would recommend clawing back from the CEO. Appendix D provides the exact 
wording used in the experiment for all of the manipulations and the wording for the dependent 
variable. 
In Step 3, participants respond to the PEQ. The PEQ includes: 1) manipulation check 
questions, 2) questions relating to the scenario, including participants’ estimate of the average of 
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other board members’ responses which I use as an alternative dependent variable, and 3) questions 
about clawbacks generally. (See Section 4.6 Post-Experiment Questionnaire for specific questions 
asked in each of these categories.)  
4.5 Dependent Variables 
Board member participants are asked to recommend an amount to claw back from the CEO. 
I use Own Clawback Percentage, which is the percentage of the compensation they choose to claw 
back (the amount of compensation the board member chose to clawback divided by $4.5 million, 
the total amount of incentive compensation that could have been clawed back), as my initial 
dependent variable.  
Because my initial dependent variable is a self-reported measure, there is potential for bias 
in participants’ responses. As mentioned earlier, social desirability bias is the tendency of 
individuals to under-report socially undesirable behavior and to over-report socially desirable 
behavior. Prior research shows that there are two distinct causes for this misreporting behavior: 
impression management and self-deception (Zerbe and Paulhus, 1987). Individuals engaging in 
impression management report that they adhere to socially desired behavior despite consciously 
knowing they would not, or do not, actually behave that way in an attempt to improve how others 
view them. Individuals engaging in self-deception truly believe they would act ethically and are 
not aware of their bias. Self-deception protects individuals’ self-esteem and, in general, allows 
them to believe they are more ethical than others (Randall and Fernandes, 1992). My study is not 
designed to distinguish between these behaviors. Rather, my goal is to measure whether social 
desirability bias is present in participant responses. 
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If participants perceive that clawing back a greater amount is the socially desired response, 
and they are subject to social desirability bias, they would over-report the amount they would claw 
back (Paulhus, 1984; Randall and Fernandes, 1991; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). In contrast, board 
members might believe it is appropriate to claw back a certain amount, but are concerned about 
the potential unintended future costs to shareholders of doing so. These potential costs, as 
discussed in Section 3.4, include legal fees or future increases in CEO salaries to compensate for 
increased risk (Piwowar, 2015). These practical concerns could reduce the amount of 
compensation board members are willing to claw back from the CEO. 
In anticipation of the potential for social desirability bias to influence participant responses, 
I collected the necessary information to determine whether social desirability bias is present and 
collected participant responses for an alternative dependent variable. I discuss these measures 
below when describing the PEQ. 
4.6 Post-Experiment Questionnaire (PEQ) 
The first category of questions in the PEQ is manipulation check questions. Board member 
participants answer two questions related to information in the scenario to assess their 
understanding of the case materials. First, they are asked who nominated them to the board. Next, 
participants are asked about the CEO’s involvement in the inflated inventory from the prior period. 
This second question is used to ensure that participants understand that it was unclear in the case 
whether the CEO intentionally overstated the inventory because beliefs regarding the CEOs role 
in the overstatement could influence participants’ clawback responses. Specifically, participants 
were asked “Which of the following reflects what was explained in the case materials?” 
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Participants could choose from the following answers: 1) it was unclear whether the overstatement 
was intentional, 2) the CEO intentionally inflated net income, or 3) the restatement was due to an 
unintentional error. The first response is the correct response. 
After answering the manipulation check questions, participants respond to questions 
designed to measure whether social desirability influences their responses and to provide an 
alternative dependent variable in case their responses reflect social desirability bias. I ask 
participants: 
1. Disregarding practical considerations, what do you believe as an individual is the 
right amount to claw back from the CEO? 
2.  Other board members were also asked what amount they would recommend clawing 
back from the CEO. What is your estimate of their answer, on average? 
If board members’ responses exhibit social desirability bias, the amount they say they 
would claw back should be similar to their answer regarding the right amount to claw back. Prior 
ethics research has used questions eliciting participants’ beliefs about what others do as a way of 
overcoming the hurdles of impression management and self-deception in social desirability bias 
(Jurgenson, 1978; Cohen, 1998, 2001). Therefore, in question 2, I ask board members to estimate 
the average of other board member participants’ clawback decisions, and I use an approach 
common in behavioral economics research (Babcock and Lowenstein, 1997) to incentivize them 
to estimate correctly by offering an additional $5, either for themselves or for charity, if they 
estimate within $.5 million of the correct answer. Because I find that participants engage in social 
desirability bias in their own clawback decision, I use participants’ response in Question 2, Others’ 
Clawback Percentage, as an alternative dependent variable. 
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In addition to these questions, participants respond to questions about the motives or beliefs 
that affected their clawback decisions during the experiment and questions designed to determine 
how board members might justify those decisions. Specifically, there are questions regarding the 
perceived impact on shareholders of clawing back incentive compensation, the extent to which the 
board member believes the CEO is responsible for the restatement, whether board members are 
reluctant to take away compensation as opposed to not providing the compensation in the first 
place (loss aversion), and the extent to which the clawback policy is fair to the CEO and to 
shareholders. I also ask for open-ended responses regarding any formula participants may have 
used to decide on the amount of clawback to recommend and why they did or did not feel obligated 
to the CEO. Finally, participants responded to a series of survey questions. These questions and 
their related results are described later in Chapter 6.  
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5.0 Results for my Experiment 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 5 describes the results of my experiment. Section 5.2 reports the results for 
participants’ responses to the manipulations checks. Section 5.3 checks the assumptions of the data 
for use in ANOVAs. Section 5.4 reports the results of tests of my hypotheses.  Section 5.5 provides 
supplemental analysis of the data when I include the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition.  
5.2 Manipulation Checks 
Because board members could not show reciprocity unless they knew who nominated them 
to the board, I ask participants to indicate who nominated them. Specifically, participants answer 
the following question: “In the scenario you just read, who nominated you to the board of directors 
for Molly Coddle, Inc.?” Their choices are: the CEO, a head-hunting firm, or a group of investors, 
and the correct response depends on the condition to which they were randomly assigned. Of the 
112 participants, seven board members failed the nomination manipulation check (93.75% passed 
the manipulation check).12 I omit these seven participants and perform all statistical tests using 
only the responses of board members who passed the nomination manipulation check. 
                                                 
12 All 7 participants who failed the manipulation check had previously accessed the study without completing 
it. It seems that these participants began the study on their mobile phone (which is cumbersome) and then switched to 
a different device. When they switched devices, they were assigned to a different treatment condition, but did not 
realize it because they continued the study where they had left off (i.e., after the treatment condition manipulation was 
mentioned). The evidence supports this understanding of what occurred (based on reading times on subparts of the 
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The second manipulation check asked participants whether Molly Coddle, Inc.'s 
restatement was due to error, fraud, or whether it was unclear. This question was meant to measure 
whether participants understood that the experimental instrument was unclear about the CEO’s 
intentions. Eleven participants responded incorrectly, with nine responding that the misstatement 
was due to an error and two responding it was due to fraud. These 11 participants appear to have 
misinterpreted this question as asking for their opinion about whether the misstatement was due to 
fraud or error. In the PEQ I include a more direct measure of participants’ beliefs about the CEO’s 
responsibility for the misstatement (see Section 5.4.1.1), so I do not use the answers to this second 
manipulation check question as a screen and do not omit any participants based on responses to 
this second manipulation check. 
 
5.3 Assumptions 
I use independent t-tests and two-way ANOVAs to test my hypotheses. I first check the 
assumptions for these statistical tests to ensure there are no violations that could raise concerns 
about their use. The following assumptions are met by experimental design: 1) the dependent 
variable is measured on a continuous scale, 2) the independent variable comprises two categorical, 
independent groups, and 3) observations are independent. However, I test the following 
assumptions that relate to the data: 1) no significant outliers, 2) homogeneity of variances, and 3) 
                                                 
task, etc.) and indicates that all 7 participants correctly identified the nomination party associated with their first 
attempt at completing the study. 
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normally distributed dependent variables. See Appendix A for a list of all variables used in the 
study and their definitions.  
The initial dependent variable used in my analysis is Own Clawback Percentage, which is 
the percentage of total possible clawback that the participant indicated they would claw back (i.e., 
the actual amount of incentive compensation clawed back divided by the total amount of incentive 
compensation that could have been clawed back). As explained more fully later, I also use Others’ 
Clawback Percentage and Others’ Clawback - Dichotomous as alternative dependent variables in 
my analysis. Others’ Clawback Percentage is board members’ estimate of the average clawback 
response of other board members in the same treatment condition divided by the total amount of 
incentive compensation that could have been clawed back. Others’ Clawback - Dichotomous is 
measured as whether participants believed other board members would (Yes) or would not (No), 
on average, claw back the full amount of the CEO’s compensation allowed by the clawback policy.   
To check for possible outliers, I visually examined a scatter plot and tables listing 
frequency of responses and extreme values and did not identify any outliers. I use Levene’s test to 
determine that the assumption for homogeneity of variances was not violated. To test the 
assumption of normality, I first checked the data visually. Because the data appeared to be heavily 
skewed, I also performed the Shapiro-Wilks test and found that the assumption of normality was 
violated for both Own Clawback Percentage (z = 5.84, p < .001) and Others’ Clawback Percentage 
(z = 2.61, p < .01).  Although I primarily test my hypotheses using ANOVAs, which are fairly 
robust to violations of normality, I also conduct non-parametric statistical tests to determine 
whether the violation of normality influenced my conclusions. I found no important cases in which 
the non-parametric tests resulted in different conclusions from the standard parametric tests, and 
therefore I only report the results of the parametric tests in the analysis that follows. 
 41 
5.4 Tests of Hypotheses 
5.4.1  Tests of Hypotheses Using the Initial Dependent Variable: Board Members’ Own 
Clawback Percentage 
H1 predicts a main effect of Nomination Source on the clawback decision and H2 predicts 
a main effect of Restatement Size on the clawback decision. H3 predicts an ordinal interaction of 
Nomination Source and Restatement Size on the clawback decision because I expect board 
members to find it more difficult to justify acting reciprocally toward the CEO when there is a 
large restatement. Figure 2 illustrates the nature of the predicted interaction. 
In tests of my hypotheses, I use only the CEO and Shareholder Nomination condition data 
and do not yet include the data from board members in the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination 
condition. The Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition is not relevant for my hypotheses tests 
because my hypotheses involve reciprocal behavior, but participants’ clawback decisions in the 
Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition could not reciprocate the head-hunting firm that 
nominated them. The Supplementary Analysis in Section 5.5 uses participant responses from the 
Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition as a baseline against which to compare the CEO and 
Shareholder Nomination conditions. 
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Figure 2 Predicted Interaction of Nomination Source and Restatement Size on Board 
Members' Clawback Decision 
 
 
 
5.4.1.1 Hypothesis H3 
I begin by testing H3 because it predicts an interaction of Nomination Source and 
Restatement Size.  The related results are reported in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 3. I first 
examine whether the difference in the clawback amounts in the Shareholder Nomination versus 
CEO Nomination conditions is larger when the CEO misses the earnings target by a smaller 
amount. Table 1, Panel A presents the relevant means and Panel B presents the results of the two-
way ANOVA using participants’ clawback percentage, Own Clawback Percentage, as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are Nomination Source, with the two levels being 
CEO Nomination and Shareholder Nomination, and Restatement Size, with the two levels being 
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Large and Small. The interaction in the ANOVA is not significant (F = .18, p = .67), which is not 
consistent with H3. 
 
 
Figure 3 Observed Effects of Nomination Source and Restatement Size on Board Members' 
Clawback Decision 
 
 
Recall that the reason for the interaction predicted in H3 is that when there is a large 
restatement, the obligation to shareholders is expected to increase in saliency. When there is a 
smaller restatement, it was expected that it would be less clear to board members that shareholders 
expect them to claw back the incentive compensation. In this circumstance, board members were 
expected to experience greater cognitive dissonance because of their competing perceived 
obligations to reciprocate to the CEO and their obligation to shareholders, making it easier to 
justify clawing back less from the CEO. In contrast, the large restatement was expected to make 
the obligation to shareholders more salient, making it difficult for a board member nominated by 
the CEO to justify clawing back less. Thus, I collected several measures to test participants’ 
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potential perceived justifications for clawing back less from the CEO. Specifically, I test the extent 
to which participants believed 1) the CEO was responsible for the restatement, 2) the clawback 
policy was fair to the CEO, and 3) the clawback policy was fair to shareholders. Table 1, Panel C 
shows the interaction term from the ANOVAs conducted using each of these justification measures 
as the dependent variable and the same independent variables as used in the analysis reported in 
Panel B. The fact that none of these interaction terms is significant is consistent with not finding 
the predicted interaction for my initial dependent variable (Own Clawback Percentage). That is, 
because participants’ justifications do not differ based on the size of the restatement, the percentage 
they clawback also does not differ based on this variable.  
5.4.1.2 Hypothesis H1 
Next, I analyze the predicted main effect of Nomination Source. H1 predicts that, due to 
reciprocity, board members who were nominated to the board by the CEO (mean = .86) will claw 
back less than board members who were nominated by shareholders (mean = .87). The ANOVA 
in Table 1, Panel B, shows that the main effect of Nominating Source on board members’ clawback 
percentages (Own Clawback Percentage) is not significant (F = .07 p = .74).  
As explained in Section 3.3, the reason for the predicted main effect of Nomination Source 
in H1 was that board members were expected to feel some level of obligation toward both the CEO 
and shareholders, but that those nominated by the CEO would feel a greater obligation to the CEO 
relative to those nominated by the shareholders. To test this reasoning, I conduct a planned 
comparison of whether the difference between board members’ perceived obligation toward 
shareholders and toward the CEO (Obligation Toward Shareholders – Obligation Toward CEO) 
depends on who nominated them to the board. Table 1, Panel D shows that, consistent with not 
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finding the predicted difference for Own Clawback Percentage in H1, I also do not find a difference 
in the perceived obligation to the CEO versus shareholders (t= .38, p = .35). 
5.4.1.3 Hypothesis H2 
H2 predicts that board members will claw back more when the Restatement Size is large 
than when it is small. Table 1, Panel B presents the results of the related tests. Consistent with H2, 
I find that Restatement Size significantly influences participants’ Own Clawback Percentage (F = 
3.74, p = .03, one-tailed). As expected, board members clawed back more when there was a large 
restatement because the CEO missed the earnings target by a larger amount (mean = .92) than 
when the restatement was smaller because the CEO missed the target by a smaller amount (mean 
= .81). 
In summary, I did not find any evidence of reciprocity or cognitive dissonance in 
participant responses using Own Clawback Percentage. I did find a main effect of restatement size 
on their willingness to claw back from the CEO, but nomination source did not influence their 
decision to claw back. Next, I test whether social desirability bias appears to have influenced 
participants’ Own Clawback Percentage. 
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Table 1 Tests of Hypotheses about Nomination Source and Restatemement Size 
 
 
          
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Own Clawback Percentage a  
          
 
Large 
Restatementa  
Small 
Restatementa  Combined           
CEO Nominationa 0.90  0.81  0.86 
 
(0.20) 
n = 20  
(0.32) 
n = 18  
(0.26) 
n = 38 
 
Shareholder Nominationa 0.94  0.80  0.87 
 
(0.14) 
n = 18  
(0.32) 
n = 19  
(0.25) 
n = 37 
 
Combinedb 0.92  0.81   
 
(0.17) 
n = 38  
(0.31) 
n = 37   
           
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b The Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition is not used in this analysis because H1 tests for reciprocity. 
Participants in the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition cannot reciprocate toward the nominating 
party. 
 
 
      
          
          
Panel B: ANOVA with Own Clawback Percentage as the Dependent Variable a 
          
  Partial SS   df   MS   F   p-valueb 
Model 5.15  3  1.72  1.31  0.28 
Restatement Sizea 4.89  1  4.89  3.74  0.03 
Nomination Sourcea 0.10  1  0.10  0.07  0.39 
Interaction of Restatement Size and 0.23  1  0.23  0.18  0.34 
     Nomination Source          
           
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b Reported p-values are one-tailed to reflect the directional prediction of the effect. 
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             Table 1 (Continued) 
 
          
Panel C: ANOVAs with Same Independent Variables as in Panel B but Using the Various 
Justification Measures Underlying the Interaction Predicted in H3 as the Dependent Variable 
          
 
Interaction of 
Restatement Size and 
Nomination Sourcea   
Dependent Variable in the ANOVA F   p-value   
CEO Responsibility for Restatementa 0.06  0.80   
Clawback Policy Fair to CEOa  2.35    0.13b 
  
Clawback Policy Fair to Shareholdersa 0.18  0.67   
           
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b The means for participants' responses to the justification measure “Clawback Policy is Fair to CEO” 
are not in the predicted direction.   
          
          
          
Panel D: T-test with Difference in Perceived Obligation to the Shareholders versus the CEO as the 
Dependent Variable, which Underlies the Reciprocity Prediction in H1, and Nomination Source as the 
Independent Variablea 
          
  t   p-value   
(Obligation Toward Shareholdersa) – (Obligation Toward CEOa) 0.38  
0.35 
            
 a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
5.4.1.4 Tests for Social Desirability Bias 
The results presented above are based on tests using a dependent variable that asks 
participants to report what they would do (Own Clawback Percentage). However, social 
desirability bias predicts that participants will report that they would do whatever they believe is 
the socially desirable thing to do (Edwards, 1953; Zerbe and Paulhus, 1987; Randall and 
Fernandes, 1991). I compare participants’ clawback percentage to what they say is the right amount 
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to claw back if they ignored practical considerations (Ethical Clawback Percentage; see Section 
4.5 for exact wording).  This tests whether participants indicate that they do what they consider to 
be ethical. Table 2, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for these variables. 
When asked what amount they would claw back from the CEO, on average, participants 
responded that they would claw back 85% of the $4.5 million in incentive compensation. When 
asked what participants believed was the right amount to claw back, disregarding practical 
considerations, board members responded that 83% of $4.5 million was the right amount to claw 
back. Table 2, Panel B reports the results of the t-test comparing these two responses. I find that 
participants’ responses to these two questions are not significantly different (z = .67, p = .50). 
Moreover, approximately 90% of participants provided identical responses to both the percentage 
they would claw back (Own Clawback Percentage) and the ethical amount to claw back (Ethical 
Clawback Percentage). These results are consistent with social desirability bias, which predicts 
board members will report that they would claw back the amount they believe is the socially 
desirable or ethical amount to claw back.  
I also compare Own Clawback Percentage to participants’ estimate of other board 
members’ clawback percentage (Others’ Clawback Percentage). The results of the t-test are 
reported in Table 2, Panel C. Participants believe other board members would claw back only 68% 
of the incentive compensation, on average, which is significantly lower than their own average 
clawback percentage of 85% (z = 6.03, p < .01). This finding is also consistent with social 
desirability bias because participants indicate that they would respond more ethically than other 
board members would. Recall that this could be true either because participants are engaging in 
impression management or because they believe that they act more ethically than others. My goal 
is not to differentiate between these possible explanations, but rather only to test for social 
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desirability bias. Because I find evidence consistent with social desirability bias influencing 
participants’ responses, I repeat the hypotheses tests reported above for Own Clawback Percentage 
using board members’ estimates of other board members’ responses (Others’ Clawback 
Percentage) as the dependent variable, which is an approach often used in prior ethics research 
(Jurgenson, 1978; Cohen, 1998, 2001). 
 
 
Table 2 Tests for Social Desirability Bias 
 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Participants' Own Clawback Percentage,   
               Participants' Belief about the Right (Ethical) Percentage to Claw Back, and Participants’  
               Estimates of Other Board Members' Clawback Percentage     
        
 CEOa   
Head-
Hunting 
Firma   Shareholdera   Totalb 
Own Clawback Percentagea .86 (.26)  .81 (.29)  .87 (.25)  .85 (.27) 
Ethical Clawback Percentagea .87 (.26)  .74 (.33)  .86 (.25)  
.83 (.28) 
 
Others' Clawback Percentagea .64 (.29)  .68 (.30)  .72 (.3)  .68 (.29) 
        
        
Panel B: T-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests       
        
 t-test  Wilcoxon 
Comparison t   p-value   z   p-valuec 
Own Clawback % = Ethical Clawback % 0.06  0.94  -0.018  0.99 
Own Clawback % > Others' Clawback % 6.22  <0.001  5.498  <0.001 
         
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b All three Nomination Source conditions are used in this analysis. 
 
c Reported p-values are two-tailed due to a lack of predicted relationships. It was not clear whether board 
members would engage in social desirability bias, or whether their own clawback decisions were based on 
their ethical reasoning in addition to other practical considerations. 
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5.4.2  Tests of Hypotheses Using the Estimated Clawback Percentage of Other Board 
Members (Others’ Clawback Percentage) as the Dependent Measure 
5.4.2.1 Hypothesis H3 
I repeat all of my tests of hypotheses using my second dependent measure, Others’ 
Clawback Percentage, and report these results in the same order reported using my initial 
dependent measure, Own Clawback Percentage.  Therefore, I begin by testing Hypothesis H3.  I 
repeat the ANOVA used to test H3 earlier, except that I now use Others’ Clawback Percentage as 
the dependent variable.  The two independent variables are again Nominating Source and 
Restatement Size. Table 3, Panel A presents the related descriptive statistics and Figure 4 presents 
a visual depiction of the data. Consistent with my initial test of H3 using Own Clawback 
Percentage, the ANOVA in Table 3, Panel B again shows no significant interaction between 
Nominating Source and Restatement Size (F = .00, p = .48).  
5.4.2.2 Hypothesis H1 
I next test H1 using Others’ Clawback Percentage as the dependent measure. I find a 
marginally significant main effect of Nominating Source (F = 2.65, p = .11, one-tailed), indicating 
that participants estimate that others will claw back less when they are nominated by the CEO 
(mean = .64) than when they are nominated by shareholders (mean = .72). This result is consistent 
with H1 if we assume that Others’ Clawback Percentage is a better measure of what participants 
would actually do than Own Clawback Percentage, which appears to reflect social desirability bias.    
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Figure 4 Observed Effects of Nomination Source and Restatement Size on Participants’ 
Estimate of Other Board Members' Clawback Decision 
 
 
The combination of results using participants’ own clawback percentage (Own Clawback 
Percentage) and their estimates of others’ clawback percentage (Others’ Clawback Percentage) 
provides potential insight into board members’ clawback decisions. The results for Own Clawback 
Percentage indicate board members believe the socially desired response is to claw back a high 
percentage of the incentive compensation, regardless of who nominated them to the board. 
However, the results for Others’ Clawback Percentage suggests that what they would actually do 
in this situation may differ from what they say they would do (Fisher, 1993) or that they believe 
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they are more ethical than other board members are.  Regardless of the interpretation of the results 
for Others’ Clawback Percentage, the combination of results suggests that on actual boards, the 
nominating source might influence board members’ clawback decisions.  
Although, as reported above, I find a marginally significant main effect of reciprocity using 
Others’ Clawback Percentage as the dependent variable, I do not have any PEQ data to conduct a 
test of the mechanism underlying this main effect. Specifically, because I did not collect measures 
of participants’ beliefs about other board members’ feelings of obligation toward the CEO or 
shareholders, I am unable to determine the reason underlying my finding of reciprocity when I use 
Others’ Clawback Percentage as the dependent variable. 
5.4.2.3 Hypothesis H2 
Next, I repeat my earlier tests of H2, except I use Others’ Clawback Percentage as the 
dependent measure. H2 predicts that board members will claw back more when the size of the 
restatement is large than when it is small. The results of the related tests are reported in Table 3, 
Panel B. Consistent with H2, and with my earlier test of H2 using Own Clawback Percentage, I 
again find a significant main effect of Restatement Size. Specifically, participants’ responses in 
the Large Restatement Size condition (mean = .73) are significantly higher (F = 2.67, p = .05) than 
in the Small Restatement Size condition (mean = .63).  
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Table 3 Tests of Hypotheses about Nomination Source and Restatement Size Using Others’ 
Clawback Percentage as the Dependent Variable 
 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Others’ Clawback Percentage a  
           
 
Large 
Restatementa  
Small 
Restatementa  Combined  
           
CEO Nominationa 0.70  0.58  0.64  
 (0.29)  (0.28)  (0.29)  
 
Shareholder Nominationa 0.78  0.67  0.72  
 
(0.25) 
 
  (0.33) 
 
(0.30) 
 
 
Combinedb 0.73  0.63    
 (0.27)  (0.31)    
            
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b The Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition is not used in this analysis because H1 tests for reciprocity. 
Participants in the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition cannot reciprocate toward the nominating 
party.  
         
           
           
Panel B: ANOVA with Dependent Variable Others’ Clawback Percentage a 
           
  Partial SS   df   MS   F   
p-
valueb  
Model 6.99  3  2.33  1.35  0.26  
Restatement Sizea 4.60  1  4.60  2.67  0.05  
Nomination Sourcea 2.65  1  2.65  1.54  0.11  
Interaction of Restatement Size and 0.00  1  0.00  0.00  0.48  
     Nomination Source           
            
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b Reported p-values are one-tailed due to predicted relationships.      
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5.4.3  Tests of Hypotheses Using a Dichotomous Dependent Variable Based on Whether 
Participants Estimate that Other Board Members Will or Will Not Choose to 
Claw Back the Full Possible Clawback Amount 
I also test my hypotheses using a dichotomous variable (Others’ Clawback - Dichotomous) 
based on whether participants believed other board members would, on average, claw back the full 
amount of the CEO’s compensation allowed by the clawback policy. I coded Others’ Clawback - 
Dichotomous as 1 if participants estimated the average of other board members’ clawback 
responses was the full clawback amount of $4.5 million (i.e., the full amount of CEO compensation 
subject to the clawback), or as 0 if participants estimated that other board members would claw 
back less than the full $4.5 million. I use $4.5 million because over 70% of board members 
responded that the right amount to claw back (Ethical Clawback Percentage) was $4.5 million, 
which is the full amount subject to the clawback policy. Table 4, Panel A provides the descriptive 
statistics for Ethical Clawback Percentage and Table 4, Panel B shows that Ethical Clawback 
Percentage does not vary by condition, meaning that the perceived right amount to clawback is not 
different based on Nomination Source or Restatement Size. Thus, in this analysis, I test whether 
participants believe that other board members will, on average, do what board members consider 
to be the right thing. 
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Table 4 Tests to Determine the Perceived Ethical Amount of Clawback for Use in 
Alternative Tests of Hypotheses 
 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Ethical Clawback Percentage a 
 
           
 
Large 
Restatementa  
Small 
Restatementa  Combined
 
 
           
CEO Nominationa 0.85  0.67  0.76  
 (0.37)  (0.49)  (0.43)  
 
Shareholder Nominationa 0.83  0.58  0.70  
 
(0.38) 
 
  (0.51) 
 
(0.46) 
 
 
Combinedb 0.84  0.62    
 (0.37)  (0.49)    
            
 
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b The Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition is not used in this analysis because H1 tests for 
reciprocity. Participants in the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition cannot reciprocate 
toward the nominating party. 
  
         
           
           
Panel B: Log Linear Analysis with Dependent Variable Full (100%) Clawbacka 
           
  IRR   z   p-valueb       
Restatement Sizea 1.28  0.48  0.37      
Nomination Sourcea 0.87  0.36  0.26      
Interaction of Restatement Size  1.13  0.62  0.41      
     And Nomination Source           
            
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.      
 
b Reported p-values are one-tailed due to predicted relationships.      
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Figure 5 Observed Effects of Nomination Source and Restatement Size on the Percentage 
of Participants Estimating that Other Board Members Claw Back the Full Amount (100%) 
 
5.4.3.1 Hypothesis H3 
I again test all my hypotheses in the same order, and therefore begin with Hypothesis 3. 
Because my dependent variable is now a dichotomous variable, I use loglinear regressions to test 
my hypotheses. Table 5, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics and Table 5, Panel B presents 
the results for the loglinear regression. Figure 5 provides a visual representation of the data. I find 
a marginally significant interaction between Nomination Source and Restatement Size (F = -1.29, 
p = .10, one-tailed) in the predicted direction. Specifically, the difference in participants’ estimates 
for board members who were nominated by the CEO versus those nominated by shareholders is 
larger when the Restatement Size is Small (SH mean 37% - CEO mean 11% = 26% difference) 
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than when the Restatement Size is Large (SH mean 39% - CEO mean 40% = -1% difference). This 
result differs from my results using either Own Clawback Percentage or Others’ Clawback 
Percentage as the dependent variable, and is consistent with the pattern predicted in H3. 
5.4.3.2 Hypothesis H1 
I next test H1 using the Others’ Clawback – Dichotomous dependent variable. Table 5, 
Panel B shows a marginally significant main effect of Nomination Source (z = 1.5, p = .068, one-
tailed), which indicates that participants’ estimates that others will claw back the full amount of 
compensation are lower when board members are nominated by the CEO (mean = 26%) than when 
they are nominated by the shareholders (mean = 38%). This result is consistent with the reciprocity 
predicted in H1.   
5.4.3.3 Hypothesis H2 
Finally, I test H2 using Others’ Clawback - Dichotomous as the dependent variable. Table 
5, Panel B, shows that consistent with H2 (and with my previous tests of H2), Restatement Size 
has a significant effect on participants’ estimates of other board members’ willingness to claw 
back the full amount (z = 1.62, p = .05, one-tailed). Specifically, participants believed that other 
board members would be more willing to claw back the full amount when the CEO missed the 
target by a larger amount (mean = 39%) than when the CEO missed the target by a smaller amount 
(mean = 24%).  
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Table 5 Alternative Tests of Hypotheses about Nomination Source and Restatement Size 
Using Others' Clawback - Dichotomous as the Dependent Variable 
 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Others’ Clawback - Dichotomousa 
          
 Large Restatement
a  Small Restatement
a  Combined 
          
CEO Nominationa 0.40  0.11  0.26 
 (0.50)  (0.32)  (0.45) 
 
Shareholder Nominationa 0.39  0.37  0.38 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.49) 
 
Combinedb 0.39  0.24   
 (0.50)  (0.43)   
          
 
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b The Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition is not used because the analysis is meant to test 
reciprocity. Participants in the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition cannot reciprocate toward the 
nominating party. 
        
          
          
Panel B: Log Linear Analysis with Dependent Variable Others’ Clawback - Dichotomousa  
          
  IRR   z   p-valueb      
Restatement Sizea 3.600  1.62  0.05     
Nomination Sourcea 3.316  1.50  0.07     
Interaction of Restatement Size  0.293  -1.29  0.10     
     And Nomination Source          
           
 
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
b Reported p-values are one-tailed due to predicted relationships. 
                    
 
 
 59 
The results of all three sets of tests of hypotheses using Own Clawback Percentage, Others’ 
Clawback Percentage, and Others’ Clawback - Dichotomous are summarized as follows. When 
using Own Clawback Percentage as the dependent variable, I do not find evidence of reciprocity 
or an interaction between nomination source and the size of the restatement (which is meant to 
capture cognitive dissonance) in board member responses. However, additional tests suggest social 
desirability bias affects participants’ own responses, so board members’ own responses might not 
be the most revealing measure of their true beliefs. Using both of my measures regarding other 
board members’ clawback decisions (i.e., Others’ Clawback Percentage and Others’ Clawback – 
Dichotomous), I do find evidence of reciprocity. However, the influence of reciprocity does not 
systematically vary with the size of the restatement, as I predicted, and only did so when the 
dependent variable was Others’ Clawback - Dichotomous. Therefore, I conclude that it is likely 
that both reciprocity and restatement size can influence board members’ clawback decisions, but 
that the mechanism is not necessarily through cognitive dissonance. Because my experimental 
instrument does not provide data to test the underlying mechanism for the results obtained for 
estimates of others’ clawback decisions (either as a percentage or as a dichotomous measure), I 
am unable to understand the reasons for board members’ decisions regarding others’ estimates as 
I did for board members’ own decisions. Future research could examine whether restatement size 
changes the nature of a board member’s feelings of reciprocity.   
5.5 Supplemental Analysis 
In the previous tests of hypotheses, I use only the CEO and Shareholder Nomination 
conditions. When the CEO and Shareholder nominations lead to different clawback decisions, 
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consistent with reciprocity, it is not clear whether one or both nominating sources influenced 
participants’ clawback decisions from what they would otherwise have been.  In this section, I use 
the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition, in which participants could not reciprocate, as a 
baseline condition to better understand the influence of the two nomination source conditions. I do 
not need to use the baseline condition when the dependent variable is Own Clawback Percentage 
because I did not find any difference between the two nominating sources (i.e., no effect of 
reciprocity).  However, when the dependent variable is Others’ Clawback Percentage the baseline 
condition is useful to understand what board members’ clawback decisions would have been if 
they had not been influenced by either nominating source, and to determine whether board 
members are naturally more aligned with shareholders or the CEO absent any feeling of reciprocity 
related to their nomination to the board. 
In this analysis, I compare Others’ Clawback Percentage in both the Shareholder 
Nomination condition and the CEO Nomination condition to Others’ Clawback Percentage in the 
baseline Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition. Table 6, Panel A provides the descriptive 
statistics for all three nomination conditions used in this analysis. The average response for 
participants in the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition is 68% of the $4.5 million in 
compensation subject to the clawback decision. This is between the average responses of 64% for 
participants in the CEO Nomination condition and 72% for participants in the Shareholder 
Nomination condition.  
Table 6, Panel B shows the results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests used in 
determining the relationship of the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition to the other two 
conditions. I find that participant responses in the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition are 
not statistically different from the responses of board member participants in either the CEO or the 
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Shareholder Nomination conditions. Thus, when participants are not obligated toward the 
nominating party, they do not seem to be more aligned with one party or the other. It appears that 
both the CEO and Shareholder nominating sources influenced board members’ clawback decisions 
in my previous analysis, causing them to differ from each other.  Consistent with this conclusion, 
I conduct a Jonckheere-Terpstra test and find that the Head-Hunting Firm Nomination condition 
responses fall between the other two conditions; I find a marginally significant trend (p = .0955) 
that CEO Nomination < Head-Hunting Firm Nomination < Shareholder Nomination.  These results 
are reported in Table 6, Panel C.  
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Table 6 Comparisons of Head-Hunting Firm Condition to the CEO and Shareholder 
Nomination Conditions 
 
        
        
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Estimates of Others' Clawback Percentage in the CEO,  
               Head-Hunting Firm, and Shareholder Nomination Conditionsa     
        
 CEO  Head Hunter  Shareholder  Total 
Estimates of Others' Clawback Percentage 
.64 
(.29) 
 .68  
(.30) 
 .72  
(.3) 
 .68 
(.29) 
         
aVariable definitions are provided in Appendix A.        
        
        
Panel B: T-test Comparing Others' Clawback Percentage in Head-Hunting Firm Condition to CEO  
                and Shareholder Conditionsb 
        
Comparison of Others' Clawback Percentage t   p-value     
CEO vs Head Hunter Nomination Source 0.54  0.59     
Head Hunter vs Shareholder Nomination Source 
-
0.55  0.58     
         
bVariable definitions are provided in Appendix A.        
 
        
Panel C: Jonkheere-Terpstra Test of Hypothesized Trend CEO < Head Hunter <  
                Shareholderc   
        
Trend for Others' Clawback Percentage     p-value     
CEO < Head Hunter < Shareholder   0.10     
         
cVariable definitions are provided in Appendix A.        
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6.0 Survey  
6.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 6 describes the results of my survey. Section 6.2 reports the demographics and 
participants’ experience in detail. Section 6.3 provides an analysis of how board members view 
clawbacks in general. Section 6.4 addresses board members’ perceptions of no-fault clawback 
policies. 
6.2 Demographic Data 
After participants responded to questions related to the case materials, they responded to 
questions about clawbacks generally and answered demographic questions. (See Appendix E for 
the wording used for the questions in the survey part of the PEQ). 
Board members answered questions about their background and experience. I report the 
results of these questions in Table 7, Panel A. On average, board members were 54 years old and 
had 31 years of total business experience. Approximately 47% of participants had an average of 
13 years of experience as executives in public companies, and 34% of participants served for an 
average of 12 years as board members of public companies. Of the 112 board members who 
participated in this study, 21 reported that their only experience as board members was with not-
for-profit companies. Thus, the participant pool used for this study varied and included many board 
members with significant experience as board members for both public and private companies. 
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In addition to questions about board member demographics, I also asked participants about 
their experience with clawbacks in practice. Specifically, I asked whether participants have had 
experience in companies with clawback policies and whether they were involved with any 
clawback decisions. Participants who were involved in clawback decisions were asked to report 
how much compensation was at risk to be clawed back and what the outcome of the clawback 
decision was. Participant responses are summarized in Table 7, Panel B. Fifty-three participants 
(49%) responded that they had experience in companies with clawback policies. Twenty board 
members reported that they were involved in a total of 33 clawback decisions. I received complete 
responses for 26 of the 33 clawback decisions. The amount of compensation subject to the 
clawback decision ranged from $5,000 to $43.5 million with a mean of $6,357,333. The average 
amount actually clawed back was $2,103,833. When calculated as a percentage, the average 
clawback is 31% of the amount of compensation subject to the clawback decision. Twelve of the 
twenty-six clawback decisions resulted in no income being clawed back.  
Because of the relative infrequency of clawbacks that receive publicity, the finding that 
more than half of the clawback decisions reported in this study resulted in some amount of 
compensation being recovered is surprising. However, when taken in conjunction with the results 
from the first part of this study, the actual percentage clawed back in practice is much lower than 
the percentages that board members say they would claw back in my study and lower even than 
the amount they believe other board members would claw back. I statistically test the data to see 
if the higher clawback amounts in this study can be attributed to board members who do not have 
experience with clawbacks in practice. I find no significant difference in board members’ estimate 
of other board members’ clawback amount when comparing responses from board members with 
(mean = 3.31) and without (mean = 2.98) clawback experience (t = .39 two-tailed). Thus, 
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experience with clawbacks in practice does not seem to influence board members’ assessment of 
how other board members will respond in my study. 
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.  
Table 7 Board Member Characteristics and Experience 
 
    
    
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Board Member Characteristics   
    
Demographics (n=109) Mean   S.D. 
Age 54.01  11.70 
% Male 0.88  0.33 
% United States Citizenship 1.00  0.00 
English as the Native Language 0.98  0.13 
    
Work Experience Mean   S.D. 
Total Business Experience (in years) 31.15  11.70 
Total Executive Experience (in years) 15.93  1.29 
      Executive Experience in a Public Company (n=51)    
           % of Participants  0.47  0.50 
           Years of Experience 12.79  8.91 
Total Board Member Experience (in years) 15.97  13.86 
      Board Member Experience in a Public Company (n=41)    
           % of Participants  0.34  0.48 
           Years of Experience 11.97  9.03 
      Board Member Experience Solely in Not-for-Profit Company (n=20)    
           % of Participants 0.22  0.41 
% of Board Members Who Serve on the Following Committees:    
      Nominating and Governance 0.55  0.50 
      Audit 0.51  0.50 
      Compensation 0.54  0.50 
      Finance 0.14  0.35 
      Executive 0.06  0.23 
      Risk 0.06  0.23 
      Strategy 0.04  0.19 
      Health, Safety, and Environmental 0.05  0.21 
      Other 0.20  0.40 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
    
Panel B: Means (Standard Deviations) of Board Member Experience with Clawbacks 
    
Clawback Experience  Mean   S.D. 
% of Participants with Experience in a Company That Has a  
Clawback Policy 0.49  0.50 
% of Participants Involved in a Clawback Decision 0.18  0.39 
    
    
Clawback Decisions and Outcomes (n = 33) Mean   S.D. 
Amount of Compensation Subject to Clawback Decision 6,357,333  12,281,715 
Actual Amount Clawed Back 2,103,833  5,602,087 
Actual Amount Clawed Back as % of Compensation  
Subject to Clawbacka    
       For All Clawback Decisions 0.31  0.34 
       For All Clawback Decisions > 0 0.58  0.23 
% of Decisions That Resulted in No Clawback 0.36  0.49 
     
a One board member responded to Actual Amounts Clawed Back with percentages as opposed to 
dollar amounts. These percentages are not included in the means for the Actual Amount Clawed 
Back because the board member did not provide responses to the Amount of Compensation Subject 
to Clawback Decision. These percentages are included, however, in Actual Amount Clawed Back as 
% of Compensation Subject to Clawback. 
 
 
 
6.3 Perceptions of Clawbacks Generally 
As described in the Procedures section, participants also responded to questions designed 
to discover how board members think of clawbacks generally. Participants indicated the extent to 
which they agree with four statements: 1) that the decision to claw back compensation from the 
CEO would harm their relationship with the CEO, that it would 2) have an overall positive 
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financial effect on shareholders, 3) that clawbacks are an effective tool at preventing future 
restatements or misconduct, and 4) that clawbacks serve to instill confidence in strong corporate 
governance among shareholders. The responses are on a 7-point scale, ranging from strongly 
disagree (-3) to strongly agree (+3), with 0 being neither agree nor disagree.  
I conduct t-tests on the four variables to determine whether the participants’ responses are 
different from the neutral response. Table 8, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for all four 
variables. The responses to all four measures are greater than the neutral response of 0 (see Table 
8, Panel B; p < .001 for all). This indicates that board members believe that the decision to claw 
back, in general, harms their relationship with the CEO, has a positive financial impact on 
shareholders, helps to prevent future restatements, and increases shareholder confidence in strong 
corporate governance in the company. However, they do not agree with these statements to the 
same extent. I conduct sign tests which provide some information on whether board members have 
stronger beliefs regarding one statement over another. Table 8, Panel C provides the results of the 
sign tests used to determine the relationships among these variables. These results exhibit the 
following relationships: 
 
                                               
 
 
From this analysis, we learn that board members believe clawbacks serve several purposes, 
many of which have positive outcomes. According to participant responses, board members agree 
most with the idea that clawbacks increase shareholder confidence in the corporate governance at 
the firm. Shareholder confidence, though arguably important for maintaining share price and the 
Positive Financial Impact on Shareholders 
Prevent Future Restatements 
Harm Relationship  
       with CEO  
Increase Shareholder  
         Confidence 
<  <  
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economic stability of the stock market, could potentially be thought of as window dressing, i.e. as 
the means to make corporate governance appear satisfactory without actually having any real 
economic benefit to shareholders. However, board members’ belief that clawbacks help prevent 
future restatements and are financially beneficial to shareholders alleviates some of the concerns 
that clawbacks don’t truly serve the owners of the company. In addition, though board members 
agree least with the idea that the decision to clawback harms their relationship with the CEO, they 
still believe that it does negatively affect this relationship. This belief could lead to fewer 
clawbacks or clawbacks of smaller amounts. Future research might examine whether this belief 
decreases board members’ willingness to claw back from the CEO and how to allow board 
members to make decisions favorable to shareholders without simultaneously hurting their 
relationship with the CEO, which is important to the functioning of the board (Clune et al., 2014). 
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Table 8 Tests of Board Members' General Perceptions of Clawbacks 
 
      
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Board Member Perceptions That a Clawback Would 
Harm Their Relationship with the CEO, Have a Positive Impact on Shareholders, Help to 
Prevent Future Restatements, and Increase Shareholder Confidence in the Corporate 
Governance of the Firma   
 
      
General Perceptions Variables Mean   S.D.   
Harm Relationship with CEOb 0.42  1.52   
Positive Financial Impact on Shareholdersb 1.28  1.51   
Prevent Future Restatementsb 1.56  1.24   
Increase Shareholder Confidenceb 1.81  1.25   
       
aParticipant responses are on a 7-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree 
(+3), with 0 being neither agree nor disagree. 
 
b Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.      
      
      
Panel B: T-test Determining Whether Agreement with Statements is Different from the 
                Neutral Responsea 
      
General Perceptions Variables > 0 t   p-value    
Harm Relationship with CEOb 2.79 
 <0.001 
  
Positive Financial Impact on Shareholdersb 8.58 
 <0.001 
 
 
Prevent Future Restatementsb 12.70 
 <0.001 
 
 
Increase Shareholder Confidenceb 14.67 
 <0.001 
 
 
       
aParticipant responses are on a 7-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree 
(+3), with 0 being neither agree nor disagree. 
 
 
b Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.      
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TABLE 8 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test Comparing Relationships Among General Perceptions 
Variablesa   
      
Sign Test z   p-value   
Harm Relationship with CEOb > Positive Financial Impact on Shareholders -4.20  <0.001   
Harm Relationship with CEO > Prevent Future Restatements -4.52  <0.001   
Harm Relationship with CEO > Increase Shareholder Confidence -5.45  <0.001   
Positive Financial Impact on Shareholders > Prevent Future Restatements -1.04  0.30   
Positive Financial Impact on Shareholders > Increase Shareholder Confidence -2.43  0.02   
Prevent Future Restatements > Increase Shareholder Confidence -2.20  0.03   
       
aParticipant responses are on a 7-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree (+3),  
with 0 being neither agree nor disagree. 
 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.      
 
 
6.4 Fairness of a No-Fault Clawback Policy 
Participants are asked to rate the extent to which they agree that the no-fault clawback 
policy used in my study is fair to the CEO (mean = 2.09) and the extent to which it is fair to 
shareholders (mean = 2.04). The descriptive statistics for clawback policy fairness are provided in 
Table 9, Panel A. I compare participants’ responses to see whether participants believe this type 
of clawback policy is fairer to one of the two parties. Table 9, Panel B presents the results of the 
sign test used for this analysis. I find no difference in perceptions of fairness of the clawback policy 
toward the CEO versus the shareholders (p = .53). This finding that board members believe a no-
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fault clawback policy is equally fair to the CEO and the shareholders provides input to regulators’ 
considering whether to require companies to adopt no-fault clawback policies. 
 
 
 
Table 9 Fairness of a No-Fault Clawback Policy 
 
      
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Clawback Policy Fairness    
      
 Mean  S.D.   
Clawback Policy Is Fair to CEOa 2.09  1.14   
Clawback Policy Is Fair to Shareholdersa 2.04  1.32   
       
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.      
      
      
Panel B: Sign Test Comparing Fairness of the Clawback Policy to the CEO and to Shareholders 
      
Wilcoxon Rank Sign Test z   p-value   
Clawback Policy Is Fair to CEOa vs Fair to Shareholdersa -0.63  0.53   
      
      
 
a Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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7.0 Discussion, Contributions, and Limitations 
7.1 Discussion and Contributions 
Reciprocity and cognitive dissonance are psychological theories that have been tested and 
confirmed in a series of prior studies. I integrate these theories in my study to see how these related 
cognitive effects jointly affect board member decisions. I test for differences in board members’ 
decision to claw back compensation from the CEO based on whether they were nominated by the 
CEO or shareholders (testing for reciprocity) and whether the restatement that led to the clawback 
decision was large or small (testing for cognitive dissonance). I find no evidence that either 
reciprocity or cognitive dissonance plays a role in board members’ own decisions to claw back 
CEO compensation. However, participants are almost unanimous in their belief that clawing back 
the full amount of compensation is the ethical decision, and also respond that they would always 
claw back the full amount regardless of nomination source or restatement size. This result indicates 
that board members’ clawback responses are likely influenced by social desirability bias, which is 
participants’ tendency to over-report their own ethical behavior and underreport their own 
unethical behavior.  
To overcome this bias, I also analyze participants’ beliefs regarding other board members’ 
responses. I test my hypotheses again using both a continuous and a dichotomous variable based 
on board members’ estimates of others’ clawback decisions. The continuous variable is the 
estimated average dollar amount other board members clawback. The dichotomous variable is 
coded as 1 if board members believe that, on average, other board members will claw back the full 
amount of CEO compensation subject to clawback and 0 if board members believe the others’ 
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average clawback response is less than the full amount. Given that most believe it is ethical to 
clawback the full amount, the dichotomous variable, in effect, also tests whether board members 
believe the average board member’s response is the ethical response.  
I find evidence consistent with board members believing reciprocity plays a role in how 
other board members make their clawback decisions. In other words, board members believe their 
peers will claw back more CEO compensation when nominated by the shareholders than when 
nominated by the CEO. However, I am unable to determine whether this result is due to feelings 
of obligation toward the nominating party because I only collected participants’ own feelings of 
obligation and not their estimate of other board members’ feelings of obligation toward the 
nominating party. 
I find mixed evidence for the belief that cognitive dissonance affects other board members’ 
clawback decisions. Specifically, when testing the estimated amount that others, on average, would 
claw back (continuous variable), I find no significant difference between responses in the large 
and small restatement conditions. However, when the dichotomous variable is used as the 
dependent variable in my analyses, I find that significantly more board members believe others 
would, on average, claw back the full amount when the restatement is large than when it is small. 
Because my evidence is mixed, I do not reach any clear conclusions regarding the effect of 
cognitive dissonance on board members’ clawback decisions.   
My study has implications for regulators who will decide whether to adopt new policies 
regarding shareholder nomination of board members and mandated clawback policies. In 
particular, my experiment provides insights on how board members respond to shareholder 
nominations and answers the call by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals when they overturned 
Section 14a-11 of the SEC legislation for evidence regarding the potential costs and benefits of 
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shareholder nominations.  Specifically, my finding that board members may reciprocate toward 
the nominating party suggests that the SEC might want to allow, or even encourage, shareholder 
nominations. By allowing shareholders to nominate potential candidates for the board of directors 
on the proxy statement, the SEC could help to increase board member reciprocity to shareholders 
and thereby increase the likelihood that they will make decisions more in line with shareholders’ 
interests.   
In addition to providing evidence of a potential benefit of shareholder nominations, I also 
add to the clawback literature by asking board members’ opinions on several aspects relating to 
clawbacks. Due to the paucity of clawbacks in practice, it is important to understand how board 
members view and make clawback decisions, particularly as the SEC seeks to create new 
legislation relating to the clawback process for public companies. I find that board members 
generally believe no-fault clawback policies are fair to both the CEO and shareholders. They also 
agree that the decision to claw back compensation from the CEO due to a restatement benefits the 
company and shareholders because they believe that it increases shareholder confidence in the 
company’s corporate governance, helps to prevent future restatements, and has a positive financial 
impact on shareholders. However, board members also believe that the decision to claw back will 
have a negative impact on their relationship with the CEO, an important dynamic for board 
functioning (Clune et al., 2014). Thus, clawing back from the CEO could have positive, immediate 
consequences for shareholders, but also have potential future negative consequences by harming 
the relationship with the CEO. Proposal 10d-1 explores removing board member discretion over 
the clawback decision. One potential benefit of this proposal is that it would eliminate the resulting 
harm to the relationship between the CEO and board members since board members would not 
have a role in the decision to claw back from the CEO.  
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Both the findings from the survey data and the results from my experiment provide 
evidence that could be useful in future deliberations regarding clawbacks of compensation and 
shareholder nominations of board members. The combined results provide evidence for how the 
proposals for both shareholder access to the proxy statement for board member nominations and 
whether to remove board member discretion over the clawback decision might be connected in 
practice. For example, when shareholders are given access to the proxy statement for board 
member nomination, board member discretion over the clawback decision is more likely to be 
aligned with shareholder interests. Thus, the increased board member independence resulting from 
shareholder nominations would also have a positive impact on clawback decisions. As such, it 
might not be necessary to remove board member discretion over clawback decisions, because the 
SEC might be able to achieve the desired outcome by improving the board member nomination 
process. 
7.2 Limitations and Future Research 
A few board members who participated in this study provided the feedback that the setting 
was not applicable to all board members due to the size of net income and/or the restatement. 
Although my setting was patterned after a large, public company and the board member 
participants in my study came from firms with varying characteristics and sizes, I used them for 
two reasons. First, board members typically sit on boards for more than one company and many 
board members who sit on boards for private or not-for-profit companies also sit on public 
company boards. If I had limited my participant criteria, I could have inadvertently lost potential 
participants who would have fit the profile for my setting.  Second, participants who sit on boards 
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for private or not-for-profit companies are likely good proxies for board members from public 
companies. Analogous to studies that use MBA students as participants because they are future 
managers, I use board members of non-public entities as proxies for public company board 
members because they are likely to one day be public company board members (Remus, 1986). 
Consistent with this argument, a recent Forbes article suggests that board members who have 
experience on not-for-profit boards often leverage this experience to help gain a seat on a public 
company board (Collamer, 2017). 
Because I use real board members as participants in my study, my instrument needed to be 
kept short enough that board members, whose discretionary time is limited, could feasibly 
participate. Thus, I did not ask board members to justify their decisions. Nor did I ask for their 
beliefs about other board members’ potential mediation variables, which would have provided 
insight into how board members believe other board members justify their decision to claw back 
less when the CEO nominated them. Future research could address these limitations of my study 
by directly asking board members to justify their own decisions and how other board members 
might justify their decisions.  
My study examines a benefit of shareholder nominations, but more research could address 
some of the costs or other benefits of this hotly debated policy. If shareholder nomination remains 
a topic of consideration, additional research could examine ways to mitigate the effects of 
reciprocity toward the CEO on board members’ decisions. One potential way to mitigate these 
effects could be by decreasing the CEO’s ability to help board members, thereby reducing 
reciprocal behavior toward the CEO. This could be achieved by either removing the CEO from the 
nominating process completely or having anonymous nominations such that members of the 
nominating committee can only judge a candidate on their merits. The ability to maintain 
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anonymity might be problematic, however, since board members and the CEO generally have 
close relationships.  
Another way to mitigate the negative effects of reciprocal behavior would be to increase 
board members’ need to reciprocate toward shareholders. This could be more difficult to 
accomplish because there are relatively few ways that shareholders interact with the board. 
Currently, the shareholder vote for board nominees does not always influence the board’s decision. 
By making the shareholder vote have a greater impact on board outcomes, board members who 
are voted onto the board, or voted on to remain on the board, may feel a greater sense of obligation 
toward shareholders.  
Future research could also examine whether board members who learn of their propensity 
to reciprocate could try to compensate for this when making decisions. In addition, future research 
can address whether tighter clawback requirements might lead to higher overall salaries for top 
management to compensate for the increased risk of having their compensation clawed back. 
These concerns should be addressed and understood before establishing additional rules regarding 
clawbacks of compensation. 
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Appendix A  
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable 
  
Definition 
 
Own Clawback 
Percentage 
 
Amount of incentive compensation clawed back divided by 
the total amount of incentive compensation that could have 
been clawed back 
 
Others’ Clawback 
Percentage 
 
Participants' estimate of the average clawback response of 
other board members in the same manipulation divided by 
the total amount of incentive compensation that could have 
been clawed back. 
 
Others’ Clawback 
(Dichotomous) 
 Indicator variable that equals 1 if participants estimated the 
average of other board members’ clawback responses was 
the full clawback amount of $4.5 million, or as 0 if 
participants estimated that other board members would 
claw back less than the full $4.5 million.  
Ethical Clawback 
Percentage 
 
Participants' belief regarding the right amount of incentive 
compensation to claw back from the CEO, disregarding 
practical considerations, divided by the total amount of 
incentive compensation that could have been clawed back. 
 
Restatement Size 
 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the restatement size is large 
($260 M decrease), 0 otherwise ($63 M decrease) 
 
Nomination Source 
 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the nominating party is the 
CEO, 2 if the nominating party is a head-hunting firm, and 
3 if the nominating party is a group of shareholders. When 
comparing only the CEO and shareholder nomination 
groups, this indicator variable measures 1 if the group of 
shareholders nominate, 0 if the CEO nominates. 
 
Clawback Policy Is Fair 
to CEO 
 
Extent to which participants agree that the clawback policy is 
fair to the CEO. Values range from -3 to 3, with -3 being 
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Strongly Disagree, 0 being Neither Agree nor Disagree, and 
3 being Strongly Agree. 
 
  
 
 (Continued) 
 
  
APPENDIX A –Continued 
   
Clawback Policy Is Fair 
to Shareholders 
 
Extent to which participants agree that the clawback policy is 
fair to shareholders. Values range from -3 to 3, with -3 being 
Strongly Disagree, 0 being Neither Agree nor Disagree, and 
3 being Strongly Agree. 
Obligation Toward CEO 
 
Extent to which participants feel obligated to the CEO. Values 
range from -3 to 3, with -3 being Not Obligated, and 3 being 
Very Obligated. 
Obligation Toward 
Shareholders 
 
Extent to which participants feel obligated to the shareholders. 
Values range from -3 to 3, with -3 being Not Obligated, and 
3 being Very Obligated. 
CEO Responsibility 
 
Extent to which participants agree that the CEO is responsible 
for the restatement. Values range from -3 to 3, with -3 being 
Strongly Disagree, 0 being Neither Agree nor Disagree, and 
3 being Strongly Agree. 
 
Harm Relationship with 
CEO 
 
Extent to which participants believe that a decision to 
clawback from the CEO will harm their relationship with 
the CEO. Values range from -3 to 3, with -3 being Strongly 
Disagree, 0 being Neither Agree nor Disagree, and 3 being 
Strongly Agree. 
 
Positive Financial Impact 
on Shareholders 
 
Extent to which participants believe that a decision to claw 
back from the CEO will have a positive financial effect on 
shareholders. Values range from -3 to 3, with -3 being 
Strongly Disagree, 0 being Neither Agree nor Disagree, and 
3 being Strongly Agree. 
 
Prevent Future 
Restatements 
 
Extent to which participants believe that a decision to claw 
back from the CEO will help to prevent future restatements. 
Values range from -3 to 3, with -3 being Strongly Disagree, 
0 being Neither Agree nor Disagree, and 3 being Strongly 
Agree. 
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Increase Shareholder 
Confidence 
 
Extent to which participants believe that a decision to claw 
back from the CEO will increase shareholder confidence in 
corporate governance at the company. Values range from -
3 to 3, with -3 being Strongly Disagree, 0 being Neither 
Agree nor Disagree, and 3 being Strongly Agree. 
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Appendix B  
RECRUITMENT EMAIL MESSAGE 
Hello, my name is Melinda Ford, and I am an accounting PhD student at the University of 
Pittsburgh. For my dissertation, I am asking board members of public and private companies to 
participate in my research study, which takes about 10 - 15 minutes to complete. I truly appreciate 
your participation and, as a token of my gratitude, I will send a $25 Amazon gift card to either you 
or to a family member or friend of your choice, or I will donate $25 to the charity of your choice. 
 To participate, please either click on the link below or type the url into your internet 
browser: 
Link provided here 
Because my study requires 90 board member participants, I would also greatly appreciate 
and encourage sharing these introductory paragraphs and link with other board members you know 
who might also be willing to participate in this study. I understand that beliefs regarding lack of 
privacy and anonymity are potential deterrents to participation and want to emphasize that no 
personal or identifying information will be collected. 
 Thank you so much for your time and help, 
 Melinda Ford 
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Appendix C  
 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON COMPENSATION RECOUPMENT POLICY 
In the event of a material restatement of the Company’s financial results, the Board will 
review the facts and circumstance that led to the requirement for the restatement and will take such 
actions as it deems necessary or appropriate. The Board will consider whether any executive 
officer received compensation based on the original financial statements because it appeared he or 
she achieved financial performance targets which in fact were not achieved based on the 
restatement. The Board will also consider the accountability of any executive officer whose acts 
or omissions were responsible in whole or in part for the events that led to the restatement and 
whether such acts or omissions constituted misconduct.  
The actions the Board may elect to take against a particular executive officer, depending 
on all the facts and circumstances as determined during their review, could include (i) the 
recoupment of all or part of any bonus or other compensation paid to the executive officer that was 
based upon the achievement of financial results that were subsequently restated, (ii) disciplinary 
actions, up to and including termination, and/or (iii) the pursuit of other available remedies.  
For purposes of this Policy, the term “executive officers” means all members of the 
Executive Committee, the Corporate Controller, and such other executives of Johnson & Johnson 
as may be determined by the Board. 
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Appendix D  
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
D.1 CEO Nomination with Large Earnings Restatement 
Overview 
Assume that Molly Coddle, Inc. is a large publicly-traded retail company specializing in children’s 
clothing. This year, a member of the company’s board of directors retired.  
Although you have no personal connection with him, Tom Butler, the CEO of Molly 
Coddle, Inc., nominated you to fill the vacant position after reviewing information about you and 
other potential candidates. As is generally the case with Molly Coddle, Inc., CEO Tom Butler’s 
nomination resulted in your appointment to the board.   
Company policy requires that board members hold company stock. At this point in time, 
you hold the minimum stock requirement. All shareholders, including board members, receive 
their share of dividends distributed by Molly Coddle, Inc. 
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CEO Tom Butler’s Compensation 
Last year, CEO Tom Butler’s compensation totaled $9.8 million, which included both a 
base salary and incentive compensation as shown below: 
CEO Compensation Amount 
Base Salary $2.8 million 
Incentive Compensation $7.0 million 
Total Compensation $9.8 million 
 
The company’s Net Income last year was $960 million. Of the $7.0 million in CEO 
incentive compensation Tom received for the year (see table above), $4.5 million was received for 
achieving last year’s Net Income target of $945 million. That is, $4.5 million of the $7 million was 
received because last year’s reported Net Income of $960 million exceeded last year’s target Net 
Income of $945 million.  
 
Clawback Policy 
The Company has a clawback policy for the CEO and other chief executives as follows:  
“Under our compensation clawback policy, board members are authorized to use discretion 
to decide whether to recover all or part of any incentive-based compensation paid to the CEO or 
other chief executives in the event there is a restatement of the company’s financial statements, 
regardless of whether the restatement resulted from error or fraud. Board members will consider 
whether the CEO and other chief executives received compensation because, based on the original 
financial statements, they appeared to achieve a financial performance target, but based on the 
restated financial statements, the target actually was not achieved.” 
The clawback policy also explains that any incentive compensation recovered from the 
CEO or other chief executives will be distributed as a dividend to all shareholders, including board 
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members, all of whom are required to hold company shares. According to the clawback policy, the 
CEO and other chief executives cannot financially benefit in any way from a clawback of their 
own compensation. 
 
Restatement of Prior Year Net Income 
Early this year, while conducting the audit of last year’s financial statements, the auditors 
found that inventory had been overstated. Tom argues that the overstated inventory was not 
intentional. While the auditors suspect that the overstatement was intentional, they have found no 
evidence of Tom’s involvement. Correcting the inventory misstatement resulted in a restatement 
of last year’s Net Income from $960 million down to $700 million (a decrease of $260 million). 
As a result of this downward restatement, last year’s Net Income now falls $245 million 
below the Net Income target of $945 million that was used to determine part of Tom’s incentive 
compensation. Specifically, $4.5 million of Tom’s $7.0 million of incentive compensation was 
awarded based on reaching last year’s $945 million Net Income target. As indicated in the 
clawback policy provided above, board members are responsible for deciding whether to recover 
any, some, or all of this $4.5 million from Tom, the CEO. For purposes of this study, assume that 
only you will make this decision. 
You will decide how much of last year’s incentive compensation to recover from the CEO, 
Tom Butler, and your decision will be implemented. The amount of compensation recovered from 
Tom will be deducted from his $9.8 million compensation and then will be distributed to all 
shareholders, including board members, all of whom hold at least the required minimum of 
company shares. 
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D.2 Shareholder Nomination Wording 
Although you have no personal connection with any of them, a group of large investors 
who jointly own a significant portion of the shares of Molly Coddle, Inc. nominated you to fill the 
vacant position after reviewing information about you and other potential candidates. As is 
generally the case with Molly Coddle, Inc., the investor group’s nomination resulted in your 
appointment to the board.   
D.3 Head-Hunting Firm Nomination Wording 
Although you have no personal connection with the head hunting firm that Molly Coddle’s 
board uses to submit names for new board members, this firm has nominated you to fill the vacant 
position after reviewing information about you and other potential candidates. As is generally the 
case with Molly Coddle, Inc., the head hunting firm’s nomination resulted in your appointment to 
the board.   
D.4 Small Earnings Restatement Wording 
Correcting the inventory misstatement resulted in a restatement of last year’s Net Income 
from $960 million down to $897 million (a decrease of $63 million). 
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As a result of this downward restatement, last year’s Net Income now falls $48 million 
below the Net Income target of $945 million that was used to determine part of Tom’s incentive 
compensation. 
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Appendix E  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE, MANIPULATION CHECK, PEQ, AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
QUESTIONS 
E.1 Dependent Variable 
What amount of clawback would you recommend? 
E.2 Manipulation Check 
In the scenario you just read, who nominated you to the board of directors for Molly 
Coddle, Inc.? 
-the CEO 
-a head hunting firm 
-a group of investors 
 
Which of the following reflects what was explained in the case materials? 
- It was unclear whether the overstatement was intentional. 
- The CEO intentionally inflated net income. 
- The restatement was due to an unintentional error. 
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E.3 PEQ Related to Scenario Specifically 
Other board members were also asked what amount they would recommend clawing back 
from the CEO. What is your estimate of their answer, on average? If you estimate within .5 million 
of the average answer, you will receive a bonus of $5.00 in addition to the $25.00 payment for 
participating in this study. 
Disregarding other practical considerations, what do you believe as an individual is the 
right amount to claw back from the CEO?  
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The CEO is 
responsible for 
the inventory 
overstatement.  
              
The clawback 
policy is fair to 
the CEO.  
              
The clawback 
policy is fair to 
shareholders.  
              
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If the CEO had not already been given the $4.5 million incentive bonus before the 
restatement, what amount of bonus compensation would you recommend giving the CEO after the 
restatement took place? 
 
 
Please indicate on the scale below the amount of personal obligation you feel toward the 
CEO and the shareholders. 
______ Obligation to CEO:  
______ Obligation to shareholders:  
 
 
Please briefly explain why you felt or did not feel obligated to the CEO. 
 
Did you apply a numerical rule (i.e. a standard compensation package formula) to 
determine the clawback amount? 
 
If yes… 
Please briefly explain the formula you used. 
 
You have now completed all questions related to the scenario used in this study.  The 
following questions do not relate specifically to that scenario, but rather are related to your 
background and experience in general. 
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Please rate the extent to which you agree that a decision to claw back incentive 
compensation from a CEO would: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Harm your 
relationship with 
the CEO:  
              
Have an overall 
positive 
financial effect 
on shareholders:  
              
 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Clawbacks are 
an effective 
tool at 
preventing 
future 
restatements 
and/or 
misconduct.  
              
Clawbacks 
serve to instill 
confidence in 
strong 
corporate 
governance 
among 
shareholders.  
              
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Have you ever been involved with a company that has a clawback policy? 
 Yes  
 No  
 
What was your role with that company? Please check all that apply. 
 Board Member  
 Executive  
 Other  ____________________ 
 
Have you ever been involved in the clawback decision-making process? 
 Yes  
 No  
 
What was your role with the company during the clawback decision-making process? 
Please check all that apply. 
 Board Member 
 Executive 
 Other ____________________ 
 
How many years of professional business experience do you have: 
in total in industry? 
as a CEO or other executive of a public company? 
as a CEO or other executive of an organization other than a public company? 
as a board member of a public company? 
as a board member of an organization other than a public company? 
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If you have served as an executive or board member (or other comparable position) in an 
organization other than a public company, what type of organization was it? (Check all that apply.) 
 Not-for-Profit 
 Hospital 
 Government 
 Other ___________________ 
 
Please list the committees you have served on as a board member. (Check all that apply.) 
 Audit Committee 
 Compensation Committee 
 Nominating/Governance Committee 
 Other  ____________________ 
 None  
 
Demographics: 
Age: 
 18 - 25 
 26 - 35 
 36 - 45 
 46 - 55 
 56 - 65 
 66 - 75 
 > 75 
 
Gender: 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Citizenship: 
 U.S. 
 Other 
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Native Language 
 English 
 Other 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. You have now completed all of the questions. 
Please select how you would like to receive payment for your participation in this study. (Please 
enter an email address for the gift card or select the name of the charity to receive the donation. 
Without this information, no payment can be sent.) 
 Amazon Gift Card ____________________ 
 Children's Hospital 
 The Pittsburgh Foundation 
 Cancer Research Institute 
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